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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
TWO ESSAYS ON BORROWING FROM BANKS AND LENDING SYNDICATES 
 
 
A loan “deal” is often composed of several components (for example, a 3-year revolving 
loan, a 10-year secured senior term loan, and a 5-year subordinated term loan). The division of a 
deal into two or more components, each with different risk characteristics, is called “tranching.” 
This study recognizes the importance of tranching and establishes tranching as an integral 
component of a syndicated loan structure.  
In the first essay, we present a model to explain the economic value of tranching and 
show that riskier firms are more likely to take loans with multiple tranches. Therefore, the 
average credit spread on syndicated loans with multiple tranches is higher than that on non-
tranched loans. However, after accounting for the risk characteristics of a tranched loan, we 
show that a given tranche of a multi-tranche loan, on average, has a lower credit spread than an 
otherwise similar loan that is not part of a multi-tranche loan. We also show that the benefits of 
tranching accrue primarily to borrowers with speculative debt ratings.  
Prior studies have found an abnormal stock return of 100 to 150 basis points for firms 
that announce they have borrowed funds from a bank. Despite some conflicting evidence 
(Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Thomas and Wang, 2004; Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel, 2006), the 
literature tends to interpret this positive bank loan announcement effect as the market’s response 
to the mitigation of information asymmetry regarding the borrowing firm caused by the 
certification role of the lending banks who act as quasi-insiders.  
In the second essay, we document that a strong selection bias exists in prior studies. We 
show that less than a quarter of the loans made by banks are ever announced by borrowing firms 
and the loans that are announced are systematically different from loans that are never 
announced by the firms. Firms with low debt ratings, firms with zero or negative profits but 
positive interest expense, firms that take large loans in relation to their assets base, firms with 
little analyst following, and firms with high forecasted EPS growth are more likely to announce 
their loans. We show that while there was a positive announcement effect over the period 1987 
to 1995, loan announcements elicited zero or negative returns in the last ten years as the mix of 
companies announcing loans changed over time.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION TO SYNDICATE LENDING 
 
 
An important form of financing that has received relatively little attention in the finance 
literature is the syndicated loan (Panyagometh and Roberts, 2002; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000; 
Sufi 2007). While this medium provides annual potential funding (commitments issued) of over 
$1 trillion and represents 51% of the U.S. corporate borrowing in a given year (Weidner, 2000), 
only a few studies have investigated the formation of syndicates and the pricing of loans in this 
market.1,2 The syndicated loan market is highly global, and 60% of all syndicated loans 
originated in the United States during 1981 to 1999 had some form of foreign bank participation.  
 
I. Syndicated loans 
 
A syndicated loan requires that two or more lending institutions jointly agree to provide credit to 
a borrower (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). Typically, a bank—referred to as a “lead bank”—
wins the mandate to form and manage a syndicate on behalf of the borrower. The lead bank then 
selects the number and identity of institutions that will be invited to participate in the 
syndication, the menu of amounts (“brackets”) that will be offered, and the size of each 
participant’s allotment. The invited participants do not generally participate in the negotiation 
process.3 Syndication allows lead banks to arrange large loans that, if they acted alone, they 
could not book without either breaching regulatory or internal concentration limits (Thomas and 
                                                 
1 According to the Loan Syndication and Trading Association (LSTA), new issue volume of syndicated loans was 
$930 billion in 2003 for the United States alone. In the same year, according to the Bond Market Association, new 
issues of corporate bonds totaled $765 billion. The gross issuance of new credit facilities globally was over $2 
trillion in 1999 (Rhodes, 2000).  
 
2 Weidner (2000) reports in the American Banker that syndicated lending accounts for more underwriting revenue 
for the financial sector than both equity and debt underwriting. 
 
3 See Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) for details on the syndicated loan underwriting process. 
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Wang, 2004). To better address the factors influencing bank participation in syndicated lending, 
we must understand the history of the syndicated loan market.  
 
II. The history and the evolution of the Syndicated loan market 
 
Syndicated lending originated in the 1960s in the international banking market (Rhodes, 2000). 
The basic techniques of syndication were developed when groups of lenders came together to 
participate in large loans, primarily to governments. However, today’s syndicated loan market is 
largely a result of financial innovation and developments in the United States (Armstrong, 2003).  
 
In the 1980s, LBO and real estate development activities in the United States were at their peak. 
Banks regularly funded the large financial needs of corporations for such activities through loan 
syndications. The primary motivation for banks to syndicate loans was to limit their exposures to 
borrowers.4 Over the nineties as the syndicated loan market grew, legal changes were made to 
standardize loan trading. The Loan Syndication and Trading Association (LSTA) was set up in 
1995 to facilitate the growth of syndicated loan trading. S&P and Moody’s started rating 
individual syndicated loans, and rate-of-return indexes were created to facilitate comparison with 
other asset classes. These developments resulted in the growth of non-investment-grade 
syndicated loans with credit spreads of 150 basis points or more over LIBOR (London Inter 
Bank Offer Rate). 
 
Large loans today commonly comprise multiple components or “tranches” targeted to meet the 
risk-return needs of banks, insurance companies, and investment funds.5 Now investments banks 
not only participate in syndicated loans but they compete with commercial banks to win 
mandates to lead them. Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2005) document that investment banks led 
                                                 
4 Section 84 of the National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. Section et seq., limits the credit exposure of national banks to 
any one borrower to 15% of the unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus of the bank (Wienke, 1994). 
 
5 A syndicated loan deal often comprises several components (for example, a three-year revolving loan, a ten-year 
secured senior term loan, and a five-year subordinated term loan). The division of a loan deal into two or more 
components, each with different risk characteristics, is called tranching, and each component is called a “tranche.” 
One or more syndicate members can participate in any given tranche of a multi-tranche syndicated loan.  
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over 1,300 commercial loan syndications, raising almost $768 billion in funding, between 1996 
and 2003 (inclusive). Like mortgages and consumer loans, corporate loans are often securitized.  
 
The syndicated loan market that initially financed LBO and real estate development deals now 
serves corporate financing needs for a large universe of activities ranging from repayment of 
debt, project financing, and procurement of property, plant, and equipment to working capital 
financing. While one-third of syndicated loan volume from 1981 to 1990 was used to fund LBO 
and M&A activities, the majority of the funds raised over the last decade were used for general 
corporate purposes and for debt repayment. The syndication market now permits participants to 
tailor more precisely their credit risk exposures during both the primary distribution and 
secondary market trading phases (Armstrong, 2003). However, syndicated loans are not free of 
some common problems that plague any form of financing, namely adverse selection and moral 
hazard.  
 
III. Adverse selection and moral hazard 
 
In a syndicate setting, each bank is a direct lender to the borrower, with every member’s claim 
evidenced by a separate note, although there is only a single loan agreement contract. Normally, 
the lead arranger acts as an agent for the group, distributing information about the borrower to 
the syndicate members, coordinating the documentation process, negotiating the loan with the 
borrower, and administering repayments, for a service fee of 10 to 40 basis points.6 Since the 
lead arranger may have better information about the borrower than other syndicate members 
have, there is a potential for adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The lead arranger has 
an incentive to syndicate those loans on which its “inside information” is less favorable, for 
example. However, empirical evidence suggests that a lead bank generally does not abuse its 
information advantage over other syndicate members, presumably to maintain its reputation and 
to ensure that other banks will continue to participate in future syndicates led by the bank. 
Additionally, credit rating agencies now evaluate some syndicated loans and provide the 
participating banks with third-party assessments (Armstrong, 2003). 
                                                 
6 Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) describe in detail the process the lead arrangers follow to originate a syndicated 
loan. 
 
 4
 
IV. Relationship-based and transaction-based characteristics 
 
A syndicated loan is a hybrid form of debt that falls somewhere between private debt finance 
from a bank involving a single creditor and corporate bond finance where there are many 
creditors.7 Syndication not only has the characteristics of traditional relationship-based bank 
financing, but also quite a few characteristics of transaction-based bond financing (Boot and 
Thakor, 2000). Each loan syndicate is organized for the execution of a narrow set of transactions 
associated with a single offering, which is analogous to a transaction-based debt offering in the 
capital market. Altman and Suggitt (2000) use a sample of syndicated loans over 1991 to 1996 
and find that the mortality rates of syndicated loans measured cumulatively over a five-year 
period are quite similar to those on corporate bonds.  
 
However, the transaction-based features of syndicated loans do not tell the complete story. The 
brief formal lifespan of syndicates belies the stable informal relationships among participating 
banks evidenced by extensive overlap in membership across syndicates (Eccles and Crane, 1988; 
Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). Syndicated loans also embody information specific to the borrower, 
and the lead bank screens and monitors the borrower in a relationship-like context (Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2000). Sufi (2007) finds that whenever the borrowing firm requires more 
investigation and monitoring, the lead arranger chooses participants who have prior relationships 
with the borrower. Also, unlike announcements of bond financing that are known to elicit 
negative stock returns, announcements of syndicated loans elicit zero or insignificantly positive 
stock returns (Eckbo, 1986; Jung, Kim, and Stulz, 1996; Howton, Howton, and Perfect, 1998; 
Gasbarro, Le, Schwebach, and Zumwalt, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Pankaj Kumar Maskara 2007
                                                 
7 For a thorough review of the definition and the characteristics of a syndicated loan, see Armstrong’s (2003) Bank 
of Canada working paper series.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ECONOMIC VALUE IN TRANCHING OF SYNDICATED LOANS 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Bankers have long appreciated the credit risk diversification effect of multiple loans to borrowers 
in different industries and different regions. Banking regulations recognize this benefit and credit 
risk models explicitly account for such diversification. The academic literature tends to equate 
the credit risk diversification effect to the portfolio effect in equity holdings, despite the well-
documented difference in the return distributions of equity and debt portfolios.8 Another 
determinant of credit risk built into regulatory framework of banking and in credit risk models is 
the portfolio’s granularity. Granularity reflects the extent to which only a few obligors account 
for a given fraction of a debt portfolio’s default exposure. It is inversely proportional to credit 
concentration risk.9 Banks tend to decrease their credit risk by selling or participating in 
syndicated loans. The division of a large loan into smaller, homogenous parts leads to higher 
granularity when spread across multiple banks. Borrower-specific risks get diversified in the 
process. This aspect of the syndicated loans is self-explanatory, given our understanding and 
knowledge of credit risks and portfolio diversification effects. However, another feature of 
syndicated loans has received little attention in the academic literature. Syndicated loans can be 
“tranched” into heterogeneous rather than homogenous components that can then be distributed 
across lenders differentiated by their risk aversion. We illustrate this distinction using an 
example below.  
 
When company A borrows an additional $500 million from a single bank B, the lending bank B 
is exposed to a significant amount of credit risk because a sizeable percentage of B’s debt 
                                                 
8 Altman and Saunders (1997) survey the literature on credit risk measurement and discuss the return distributions of 
debt and equity portfolios. 
 
9 Credit concentration risk is associated with the probability of a large decline in the portfolio value because of 
default/downgrade of one or a few obligors that form a large percentage of the portfolio value. 
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portfolio is now exposed to a single obligor. The $500 million loan to company A decreases the 
granularity of B’s portfolio and increases B’s credit concentration risk. However, if B syndicates 
the loan to ten banks, it can divide the $500 million into ten pieces of $50 million each. The ten 
loans are made under the same loan contract, but each of them is now made by a different bank. 
This breakup of a loan among syndicate members ensures that no single bank assumes an 
oversized exposure to company A. This results in higher granularity of debt portfolios of all the 
participating banks in the loan syndicate and is known as the credit risk diversification effect. 
However, if company A is borrowing $500 million to repay $400 million in debt and to meet its 
working capital need of $100 million, then the $500 million loan can be structured as a multi-
tranche deal.10 The multi-tranche loan deal will have two components—a $100 million revolving 
line of credit and a $400 million term loan. This loan deal could then be financed by a loan 
syndicate. The participating banks in the syndicate with high risk aversion would participate in 
the relatively low risk revolving loan tranche, and other lenders with relatively higher tolerance 
for risk could participate in the riskier term loan tranche. In this case, a $500 million loan was 
tranched into two heterogeneous components—a revolving loan and a fixed term loan. Each 
component was then broken into homogenous slices and syndicated among the participating 
banks in each tranche. 
 
The silence of the academic literature on this topic is intriguing because over 35% of all 
syndicated loan deals originated in the nineties had multiple tranches. The increased participation 
of investment banks and other financial and nonfinancial institutions in the syndicated loan 
market has made tranching more important. Our model shows that tranching will have value 
when lenders have varying levels of risk aversion. The entry of investment banks, hedge funds, 
and mutual funds into the syndicated loan market has fulfilled this basic requirement. For 
instance, 1,087 of the syndicated loans originated in 1999 had multiple tranches, compared with 
692 of the 1995 deals and 343 of the 1990 deals (refer to Figure 2.2).11 Though the majority of 
the tranched loans made during our sample period of 1987 to 1999 had only two tranches, some 
                                                 
10 The word “deal” refers to a package of loans made to a borrower at the same time. In our study, for single-tranche 
loans (the regular loan of $500 million in our example), “deal” simply refers to the single tranche. Multi-tranche 
loans have also been referred to as “tranched loans.” Single-tranche loans have also been referred to as “non-
tranched loans” or “non-tranched loan deals.” 
11 As a percentage of total number of syndicated loan deals, the number of loan deals with multiple tranches has not 
increased over the sample.  
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deals had as many as 11 (refer to Figure 2.1). A tranched deal had an average of 2.49 tranches 
during our sample period.  
 
This research is the first to highlight this feature of syndicated loans. We show a basic difference 
in syndicated loans that use tranching and those that do not. We present a model that highlights 
the economic rationale behind this feature and provide empirical evidence to support our model. 
We show that loans to riskier borrowers are more likely to be tranched and, consequently, the 
average credit spread on tranched loans is higher than that on non-tranched loans. However, 
when we account for the risk characteristics of the loan, a tranche that is a part of a multi-part 
deal has a lower credit spread than a single-tranche loan with similar loan and borrower 
characteristics. We also show that the economic benefits of tranching are more pronounced in 
loans made to riskier borrowers with speculative senior debt ratings. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we review the literature on syndicated 
loans and credit risk. This literature is silent on tranched syndicated loans, so we also review the 
securitization literature on tranching of other types of debt. In section III we present our theory 
on tranching and our hypotheses. Then we present empirical evidence to support our theory and 
test the robustness of our results. In section V, we conclude.  
 
II. Literature Review 
 
We borrow from four different strands of literature in this chapter. The first stream was 
pioneered by Dennis and Mullineaux (2000). This literature deals with the composition and 
structure of syndicated loans. A syndicated loan has some characteristics of traditional, 
relationship-based bank financing and some characteristics of transaction-based, bond financing 
(Boot and Thakor, 2000). The banking literature has focused primarily on issues of moral hazard, 
adverse selection, and the benefits of monitoring in analyzing relationship banking. The 
composition and structure of a syndicated loan is usually designed to address these major 
concerns. Simons (1993) argues that diversification is the primary motive for syndication. She 
also finds that loan managers, to protect their reputations, do not exploit their superior 
information about borrower quality. Along the same lines, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and 
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Ivashina (2005) find that lead managers keep a larger proportion of information-problematic 
loans in their own portfolios.12 Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) also find that the likelihood a loan 
will be syndicated increases with the transparency of the borrower’s information and the 
reputation of the syndicate’s managing agent. Panyagometh and Roberts (2002) find evidence 
that lead banks take steps to resolve conflicts of interest in lending syndicates by retaining a large 
portion of loans to borrowers that are subsequently downgraded.  
 
The lead syndicate arrangers usually have prior relationships with borrowers. The lead banks 
also play a significant role in identifying and selecting members of the lending group, depending 
on past or potential relationships.13 Eccles and Crane (1988) and Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) 
document the extensive overlap in membership across syndicates. Sufi (2007) finds that 
whenever the borrowing firm requires more investigation and monitoring, the lead arranger 
chooses participants who have prior relationships with the borrower. Additionally, the lead 
arranger forms a concentrated syndicate (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004) and chooses participants 
that are geographically closer to the borrower when the creditor requires more intense 
investigation and monitoring efforts (Sufi, 2007). On the same lines, Esty and Megginson (2003) 
evaluate the syndicate structure on project finance syndicated loans to firms in 61 countries and 
find that loans in countries with weaker creditor protection have more syndicate members. They 
suggest this prevents strategic default by borrowers. Lee and Mullineaux (2004) find that 
reputable lead banks form large and diffuse syndicates, presumably because reputation formation 
and maintenance requires a large network of contacts and frequent repeat business. On similar 
lines, Corwin and Schultz (2004) examine IPO syndicates and find evidence that co-managers 
serve an important information production role and that previous relationships among syndicate 
members are strong determinants of future relationships. Although over 35% of the syndicated 
                                                 
12 While agent banks generally hold a larger share of their low-quality loans, agent banks that have a greater 
concentration of lower quality loans in their portfolio hold a smaller share of their loans. This implies that some 
banks specialize in originating loans for borrowers who fall in the lower end of the credit spectrum, and such banks 
are relatively successful in finding participants for their loans (Jones, Lang, and Nigro, 2005)  
 
13 Not only do the lead banks have relationships with the borrower, but other participant banks may have prior 
relationship with the borrower. This decreases the information asymmetry problem. Additionally, the syndicate 
members oftentimes have relationships with each other. 
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loans in the United States are tranched, this stream of literature has ignored tranching as an 
integral component of syndicated loan structure. 
 
The second strand of literature relevant to our study deals with the pricing of syndicated loans. 
This includes Dennis and Nandy, (2000); Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006), and Ivashina 
(2005). This literature contends that loan pricing is a function of lender characteristics, borrower 
characteristics, and loan structure. Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) study different types of 
financial intermediaries and find evidence that, compared with banks, finance companies make 
secured loans more frequently and are more likely to lend to riskier borrowers. Harjoto, 
Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) find that investment banks lend to less profitable, more leveraged 
firms and charge smaller credit premia for leverage than commercial banks. Hao (2003) 
examines the effects of bank characteristics on loan spreads and finds that weakly capitalized 
banks and banks with greater monitoring power extract higher rents. Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia 
(2002) find that banks with low capital tend to charge higher rates than well-capitalized banks. 
Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe (2002) find that lender monitoring ability, bargaining power, risk, 
and syndicate structure are significant influences in determining loan maturity and pricing.  
 
Strahan (1999) finds that observably riskier firms face tighter non-price terms in their loan 
contracts. Loans to small firms, firms with low ratings, and firms with little cash available to 
service debt are more likely to be small credits, to be secured, and to have a short contractual 
maturity. He also finds that loan pricing is similar for unrated firms and those with speculative 
grade ratings. Ivashina (2005) observes that loan prices on syndicated loans are cheaper than sole 
lender loans, other things equal. Angbazo, Mei, and Saunders (1998) investigate highly 
leveraged loans and find that syndicated loans have lower spreads. Dennis and Nandy (2000) 
find similar results for revolving loans. Ivashina (2005) argues that agency problems and the cost 
of borrowing can be effectively reduced by controlling the share retained by the lead arranger. 
She finds a consistently persistent negative relationship between loan yields and the share 
retained by the lead arranger. 
 
Gottesman (2004) investigates the relation between loan spreads and the default-free rate and 
finds that lenders increase commitment fees on revolving loans as LIBOR decreases. For the 
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borrower, the increase in the commitment fee partially offsets the advantages of lower interest 
cost on borrowed funds. However, Gottesman (2004) finds no evidence of an increase in annual 
fees on term loans as LIBOR decreases. Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) find that investment 
banks commonly offer term loans rather than commitment contracts and price them more 
generously than do commercial banks.  
 
Perceptions of credit risk form the primary basis for pricing loans, so the third field of literature 
relevant to our study focuses on credit risk models and credit risk diversification. Credit risk is 
defined as the degree of value fluctuations in debt instruments and derivatives because of 
changes in the underlying credit quality of borrowers and counterparties (Lopez and Saidenberg, 
2000). Loans are characterized by returns distributions that are asymmetric and highly skewed 
and exhibit very flat tails on the downside, indicating a significant credit risk element. There are 
several components of this risk: default risk, migration risk, spread risk, recovery risk, and 
concentration risk.14 Banks closely monitor the credit risk of their loan portfolios because their 
profitability and long run survival are a function of the amount of credit risk they take. 
Additionally, after amendments to the Basel Accord in 2004, banking institutions worldwide are 
encouraged to maintain regulatory capital based on the credit risk of their portfolio. Large banks 
commonly use Value at Risk (VaR) models to manage their portfolio credit risk (Altman and 
Suggitt, 2000). The four most widely used credit risk VaR models in the industry are 
CREDITRISK+ from Credit Suisse, CreditMetrics from JP Morgan, Credit Portfolio View from 
McKinsey & Co., and Portfolio Manager from KMV Moody’s. These models account for the 
concentration risk and the default correlation across different borrowers in loan portfolios.15 
When a loan is syndicated and tranched, concentration risk in the credit portfolios of 
participating banks and the default correlation across different loans in the portfolio of each bank 
are decreased. This results in lower credit risk for all the participating banks.  
                                                 
14 Default risk is associated with the possibility that the borrower will not meet its obligations to repay debt in a 
timely manner. Migration risk is associated with the possibility that the borrowing firm will be downgraded in the 
future thereby making the risk/return tradeoff on the loan inadequate. Spread risk is the risk that equilibrium 
conditions in the market will change and the return required for risky assets will change for all risk ratings (Verma et 
al., 1998, Crouhy et al., 2000). Recovery risk is the uncertainty associated with the amount the lender will receive in 
the default state.  
15 The models also account for recovery in the default state. Increased granularity because of tranching of syndicated 
loans does not affect recovery prospects.  
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For illustration purposes we consider a bank that has 15% of its debt portfolio exposed to the 
credit risk of its top five obligors. If this bank participates in a loan syndicate making a multi-
tranche loan to some other obligor and adds a small loan to its debt portfolio, the total size of its 
debt portfolio will increase. As a result, less than 15% of its portfolio will now be exposed to its 
top five obligors. As long as the new loan does not add new exposure to its existing top obligors 
and is not relatively larger than a normal loan in the bank’s portfolio, the concentration risk of 
the bank’s debt portfolio will decrease. While the average syndicated loan, especially a multi-
tranche syndicated loan, is almost two times larger than the average single-lender loan, the 
average loan after tranching and syndication to participating lenders is smaller than the mean 
single-lender loan. Second, when a small loan is added to the debt portfolio, the new loan is 
unlikely to have a perfect positive default correlation with the existing loans in the debt portfolio. 
Portfolio theory states that adding an asset with less than perfect positive return correlation with 
the existing assets results in diversification benefits. Hence, tranching a loan into two or more 
components and syndicating the tranches results in lower portfolio credit risk for all the 
participating banks. 
 
Although no papers in the syndicated loan or credit risk literatures address tranching, several 
papers in the securitization literature do. Tranching in a securitization issue involves breaking a 
pool of homogenous assets (e.g., mortgages, auto loans, and credit card receivables) into groups 
with varying risk characteristics (e.g., different seniority, collateral, or liquidity characteristics) 
so that each tranche can be sold at different prices in the capital markets. DeMarzo (2005) 
surveys the literature on this strategy and notes three broad explanations for tranching: 
asymmetric information, market incompleteness, and transactions costs.  
 
According to Boot and Thakor (1993) and Plantin (2004), tranching adds value when 
heterogeneous investors have different private information and different capabilities to screen 
investments. The models of DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) account for the 
trade off between the information-destruction effect of pooling and the risk diversification effect 
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of tranching.16 Gaur, Seshadri, and Subrahmanyan (2003) suggest market incompleteness as the 
source of tranching’s value. Tranching creates new assets with different risk and return profiles. 
This makes the market more complete by satisfying the unmet needs of some investors in certain 
states of the world. Duffie and Rahi (1995) and Riddiough (1997) note that explanations based 
on information asymmetry and market incompleteness could coexist with respect to different 
tranches within a single issue. For example, the senior tranche could be driven by asymmetric 
information and multiple junior tranches might be designed to exploit specific appetites of 
various investor clienteles. Other theories focus on the transaction costs of tranching. Cuchra and 
Jenkinson (2005) systematically test the theories on tranching using data on European 
securitizations and find support for the asymmetric information and market incompleteness 
explanations.  
 
Tranching a syndicated loan also involves the bundling and repackaging of rights to future cash 
flows. The assets in a tranched syndicated loan are those of a single borrower, unlike the pool of 
various underlying assets in a securitized issue. Therefore, the return distribution of the 
underlying assets in securitization resembles that of an equity holding, whereas the distribution 
of the underlying assets in syndication tranching has the characteristics of debt. Most important, 
a syndicated loan is carved into two or more tranches to meet the different financing needs of the 
borrowers (such as revolving loans for short-term working capital needs and term loans for debt 
repayment). The main motive for securitization is to raise cash by removing assets from the 
balance sheet so that more loans can be originated.  
 
Therefore, our model only partially resembles the theoretical explanations for securitization. As 
with the market incompleteness theory of securitization where junior tranches are designed to 
meet the specific needs of certain investors, our model also suggests that syndicated loans are 
carved into tranches with different risk characteristics to suit the different risk aversions of 
investors. However, in our model, we do not rely on information asymmetry between the 
participating syndicate lenders to explain tranching. Even though the participants in a syndicated 
loan may have different levels of private information on the borrower and have different 
                                                 
16 In home-loan securitizations, when a large number of individual mortgages are pooled, the information regarding 
the creditworthiness of individual borrowers is lost in the process. This loss of information always increases 
uncertainty and is referred to as the information destruction effect. 
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capabilities to screen investments, our model does not assume such information asymmetry. We 
assume instead that different participant lending groups in syndicated loans have different levels 
of risk aversion. These differences in the risk aversion could reflect different levels of private 
information or different capabilities of screening investments, among other things.  
 
III. The Model 
 
The underlying assumption is that there are different types of participants, i, in the syndicated 
loan market.17 For the sake of simplicity, we will assume two types of participants—banks (B) 
and non-banks (NB). These participants face different regulatory environments. Their primary 
source of funds also differs and, therefore, their cost of funds may be different. In our simple 
world, banks face stricter regulatory requirements and are bound by rules pertaining to 
acceptable risk-taking behavior. They have access to deposits that are explicitly or implicitly 
insured by the government and consequently have a low cost.18 Non-banks face weaker 
regulatory requirements.19 They are governed by sound business principles, but do not have 
access to deposits that are insured by the government and, consequently, have a higher cost of 
funds than banks. Rationality dictates that lenders will enter into loan agreements only if the 
returns on the loans are greater than the costs of funds. We refer to this minimum required return 
as the reservation return R . This implies that reservation return of non-banks exceeds the 
reservation return of banks ( BNB RR > ). Also, reflecting differences in the characteristics of 
participants i, each participant type will have a different level of risk aversion, A, the return 
required to compensate them for a marginal unit of risk.20 
 
Ai = f(cost of funds, regulatory environment) 
                                                 
17 Maskara (2006) shows that there are different types of participant groups in the syndicated loan market that 
behave differently.  
 
18 Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006) state that investment banks differ from commercial banks in terms of (1) 
sources of funds, (2) regulation, (3) relevance of customer relationships, (4) prospects for economies of scope, and 
(5) accounting rules and regulations.  
 
19 Commercial banks are more heavily regulated than investment banks because they accept insured deposits 
(Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi, 2006). 
 
20 Commercial banks are examined regularly to prevent “excessive risk-taking,” which effectively increases their 
risk aversion relative to non-examined lenders. 
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As its cost of funds increases, participant i must make increasingly riskier loans to cover the 
expense of borrowing. Therefore, Ai is a decreasing function of the cost of funds. On the other 
hand, Ai increases with the degree of regulation a participant faces. This implies that at a given 
risk level K, ANB < AB. Also, KKAi ∀≥ 0)( and )(0
1
ii RKKA
−<∀= . 
 
Both types of participants face a similar choice set of borrower/loan combinations. The 
borrower/loan combinations (BLC) are continuously distributed over a spectrum of credit risk, K, 
with a probability distribution function p(K). We assume that the credit risk of a borrower is 
adequately characterized by the credit rating, Q, assigned to it by a rating agency. Moody’s 
Investor Service (1991 p. 73) states that “ratings are intended to serve as indicators or forecasts 
of the potential for credit loss because of failure to pay, a delay in payment, or partial payment.” 
Standard and Poor’s (1998, p. 3) states that its ratings are an opinion of the general 
creditworthiness of an obligor based on relevant risk factors. The corporate rating of a firm is a 
function of its asset size, financial leverage, and business risk (Standard and Poor’s, 2006). The 
credit risk of a loan is a function of the seniority of the loan, size of the loan, type of loan 
(whether term loan, revolver, or lease), maturity of the loan, and whether the loan is secured or 
not. This implies that the credit risk, K, of a BLC can be expressed as follows: 
 
K = f(Q, maturity, seniority, loan type, secured status, loan size-to-asset size ratio) 
Where,  
Q = f(asset size, financial leverage, business risk) 
 
The participants in a syndicated loan consider the quality of both the borrower and the loan. 
Their objective function is to earn a return, R, based on the credit risk K, of the BLC such that   
∫ −+=
K
RK i
ii
i
dKARKR
)(1
)(    (1) 
The firm’s objective function is to borrow the required funds at the lowest total cost. If a BLC 
has a credit risk profile that implies RB is less than the reservation return of the non-bank, the 
borrower has no incentive to borrow from the non-bank. However, if credit risk, K, of a 
BLC(B,L) implies NBB RKR >)( , the borrower will always minimize costs by tranching the loan 
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into two different loans of size α  and 1-α , each with different loan characteristics, such that the 
credit risk, K1, of BLC(B,α L) will imply NBB RKR <)( 1  and the credit risk, K2, of BLC(B,(1-
α )L) will imply NBB RKR >)( 2 .
21 The tranching should be done such that KKK ≤+ 21 . This 
condition implies that no additional risk is created during the tranching process. The existing risk 
is just distributed differently among the two components of the loan. As illustrated earlier, 
tranching and syndicating loans can decrease concentration risk and allow for risk to be 
distributed across different lenders, thereby providing diversification benefits. Hence, after 
tranching the weighted total risk of the loan to participating lending banks may decrease. The 
total cost of borrowing of the tranched loan will be )()( 21 KRKR NBB + . This implies:  
))(1()()( 2
1
1
1 )()(21 ∫∫ −− +−++=+
K
RK NB
NB
K
RK B
B
NBB
dKARdKARKKR αα  (2) 
If the borrower were to borrow loan L from banks or non-banks alone, its cost of borrowing 
would be ∫ −+=
K
RK B
BB
B
dKARKR
)(1
)( , and ∫ −+=
K
RK NB
NBNB
NB
dKARKR
)(1
)( , respectively. 
As BNB RR > , ANB < AB at any given level of risk K> )(1 BRK
− , and ANB = AB = 0 for K< 
)(1 BRK
− , we note that:  
)()( 21 KRKKR B<+ , and )()( 21 KRKKR NB<+  NBB RKR >∀ )(  (3) 
 
Equation (3) shows that tranching creates economic value. It states that for all BLCs with credit 
risk that justifies a return higher than the reservation return of non-banks, the total cost of 
borrowing will be lower if the loan is tranched into two parts and the firm borrows each part 
from different types of participants rather than borrowing from either participant type alone. This 
leads to our first and second hypotheses. 
 
                                                 
21The primary activity of a participant in the syndicated loan market is a good indicator of the risk aversion of the 
participant. Hence, Maskara (2006) categorizes participants in the syndicated loan market into groups based on their 
primary activity and shows that investment banks are more likely to arrange, to play a lead role, or to participate in a 
multi-tranche loan than a single-tranche loan. Using different measures of risk, he also shows that investment banks 
are more likely to participate in the riskier tranches of a multiple-tranche loan. Additionally, non-bank financial 
institutions operating in relatively less constrained regulatory environment are also more likely to participate in the 
riskier tranches of a syndicated loan.  
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 Hypothesis 1: The total cost of borrowing to an average firm will be lower if the loan is 
tranched when compared with a non-tranched loan of the same size and risk characteristics.22  
 
Hypothesis 2: The benefits of tranching will accrue primarily to borrowers with high credit risk. 
 
As noted above, loan tranching has gained momentum over the last decade based on the entry of 
institutions such as hedge funds, mutual funds, and investment banks into the syndicated loan 
market. As our simple model illustrates, tranching has economic value when lenders have 
different levels of risk aversion. Our model can easily be extended to support n different types of 
participants. As we increase the value of n, the benefits from tranching will increase subject to 
the transaction costs of tranching.  
 
Now we make an assumption of efficient markets and complete information. Under the 
environment of complete information, a borrower will not take a non-tranched loan when it is 
economically beneficial to take a tranched loan. Also, in an efficient market with unique prices 
RB < RNB for K< )(1 NBRK − , RB = RNB for K= )(1 NBRK − , and RB > RNB for K> )(1 NBRK − . Also, 
no loans can be made for R< ).,0[)(1 ∞∈∀− KRK B  
 
In an efficient market with complete information, all BLC(B,L) will be tranched such that credit 
risk level Ki of each BLC(B, )Liα where ∑ = 1iα  will be loaned by participant i, ordered in 
ascending order of reservation returns, such that )( 11 +−= ii RKK if )( 1
1
+
−> iRKK . If 
)(1 iRKK −> , but )( 11 +−< iRKK , KKi = . In our simple example of two types of participants, 
all BLC(B,L) with credit risk )(1 NBRKK −> will be tranched into two loans of size α and 1-α , 
such that BLC(B, )Lα has credit risk K1 = )(1 NBRK − and BLC(B, (1- ))Lα has a credit risk K2<K-
K1. 
 
                                                 
22 We make no predictions regarding the structure of the tranched loan. We do not predict the size or risk 
characteristics of the different tranches of the tranched loan.   
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Given our set of assumptions, the expected return on all non-tranched loans and all tranched 
loans made to a population of BLC distributed continuously over a spectrum of credit risk, K, 
with a probability distribution function p(K) will be 
∫
∞
∞−
= dKKpKRRE )(*)()(    (4) 
The expected return on all non-tranched BLC, BLCnt, will therefore be  
(E BLCnt)= 0)(*)(
)(
)( )(
1
1 1
+⎟
⎠
⎞⎜
⎝
⎛ +∫ ∫
−
− −
dKKpAR
NB
B B
RK
RK
K
RK B
B   (5) 
and the expected return on all tranched BLC, BLCt will be 
(E BLCt)= dKKpARdKKpR
NB NB
NB
B RK
K
RK NB
NB
RK
RK
NB ∫ ∫∫
∞
− −
−
− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜
⎝
⎛ ++
)( )(
)(
)( 1 1
1
1
)(*)()(*  (6) 
 
Equations (5) and (6) suggest that the (E BLCnt)≤  (E BLCt), )(Kp∀ . It is also worthwhile to 
note that, despite the economic value of tranching and lower cost of borrowing to firms using 
tranched loans, the average interest rate on the tranches of such loans lent by banks (i.e., low risk 
tranche of the tranched loan) is greater than (or equal to, based on the underlying distribution) 
the average interest rate on non-tranched loans. This underpins our third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The average interest rate charged on tranched loans is higher than the average 
interest rate charged on non-tranched loans.  
 
Our first hypothesis states that the cost of borrowing to an average borrower will be lower when 
a loan is tranched as compared with a non-tranched loan of similar size and characteristics. But 
our third hypothesis states that the average interest rate on tranched loans is higher than on non-
tranched loans. Although our Hypotheses 1 and 3 appear to contradict each other, they can be 
true at the same time. This situation is analogous to the high all-in-spread observed for secured 
compared with unsecured loans. Rationality dictates that, all else equal, a secured loan has lower 
risk than an unsecured loan and it should therefore command a relatively lower return. Yet 
empirical evidence shows that high-risk loans tend more often to be secured rather than low-risk 
loans and, on average, secured loans have higher interest rates. Similarly, high-risk loans should 
be tranched, but low-risk loans need not be. Therefore, tranched loans, on average, will have 
higher interest rates.  
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Our results can be generalized for a market with N participants with different levels of risk 
aversion. In the absence of transaction costs, as N increases, the price benefit to borrowers from 
tranching increases. We have shown that as the types of participants, n, increase, a BLC will be 
tranched to n levels such that successive high-risk combinations will be tranched at the 
reservation utility of each participant. Real-world data indicate that some of the syndicate banks 
participate in more than one tranche. This does not necessarily contradict our theory because the 
regulatory capital requirements and economic capital requirements differ for different types of 
loans.23 These capital requirements may decrease when a loan is broken into two different 
tranches, thereby creating economic value for the bank.  
 
We need to interpret our results with caution, however. We have assumed efficient debt markets 
and complete information.24 Neither assumption presumably holds in the real world. Relaxing 
these assumptions could weaken our results. Also, we have not considered the role of 
information asymmetry in our model. The existence of a prior relationship between a borrower 
and a bank can mitigate the perceived credit risk of the borrower. Information asymmetry might 
unravel some of the implications of our model.  
 
IV. The Empirical Evidence 
 
We test our hypotheses using tranche-level data from the Dealscan database compiled by the 
Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). LPC maintains a database with detailed information on loans 
made to borrowers in different parts of the world from 1987 to the present. It contains both price 
and non-price terms of loans at the time of origination, along with information on the borrower’s 
rating and sales in the year prior to the loan. The data in Dealscan come primarily from SEC 
filings, although LPC also receives data from large loan syndicators, as well as from a staff of 
reporters. LPC claims that its database contains most of the loans made to large, publicly traded 
companies. We use confirmed data in our study on U.S. borrowers that are not government 
                                                 
23 The regulatory capital requirements for banks does not apply to loan commitments with a maturity of 365 days or 
less (Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi, 2006), for instance. 
 
24 Ivashina (2005) concludes that the syndicated loan market is competitive, putting bargaining power in the hands 
of the borrower.  
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entities, banks, or financial institutions. From 1987 to 1999 (inclusive), 31,233 loan deals with 
43,603 tranches were made to such borrowers.25  
 
In its tranche-level database, LPC records every component of a multi-tranche loan deal as a 
separate observation. Every record has a field for deal amount and a field for tranche amount. All 
the tranches of a given multi-tranche loan deal have the same deal amount, but the tranche 
amount may differ for each component. We tag a loan as tranched when the tranche amount is 
less than the deal amount. For a non-tranched loan, the deal amount is the same as the tranche 
amount. As mentioned earlier, we refer to a single-tranche loan (a loan that is not a part of a 
multi-tranche loan deal) as a non-tranched loan deal. Because of data errors, for some records the 
tranche amount was greater than the deal amount, or the tranche amount was less than the deal 
amount even when the loan was not part of a multi-tranche loan deal. After deleting such 
records, we are left with 43,334 tranches and 30,975 deals. Of these observations, 16,282 deals 
had more than one lender, and 8,148 deals had multiple tranches. A tranched deal had an average 
of 2.49 tranches, and a median of 2. Our study focuses on syndicated loans, so we exclude all 
loans that have only one lender participating in the loan deal. Thus our final sample includes 
23,721 loan observations.26 
 
As illustration, we present here an example of a senior secured loan deal for $365 million to 
Classic Cable (Ticker: CLSC), a provider of cable TV services with $182 million in sales the 
previous year. The loan syndicate was led by Goldman Sachs Credit Partners on 28 July, 1999, 
for refinancing debt and for financing the takeover of Buford Television, Inc. Union Bank of 
California was the administrative agent and Chase Manhattan was the documentation agent for 
the loan deal. The syndicate included 12 lenders. The other members were Mercantile Bank, 
PNC Bank, SunTrust Bank, CIT Group, Heller Financial, Natexis Banque, Summit Bank, U.S. 
Bank, and BNP Paribas. This deal had four tranches with the following characteristics.  
 
                                                 
25 Dealscan adds new loans to its database as and when it discovers loans missing from its database. We have noted 
newly added entries in the database dating back to 2000. The loans added to the database after significant delay 
could be systematically different from loans added to the database as soon as the loan is originated. This could result 
in a possible selection bias error. Hence, we have used data till 1999 only. Data from 2000 through 2006 could be 
used to further test our model. 
26 A loan observation could either be a tranche of a multi-tranched loan deal or it could be a non-tranched loan. 
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Revolving loan: The deal included a $75 million revolving line of credit maturing on 31 
July, 2007, with a commitment fee of 50 basis points if the maximum ratio of debt to 
assets (D/A) of the borrower was greater than 5.5 and 37.5 basis points otherwise. The 
line of credit was also priced based on D/A as follows: if D/A ≥  6.5 then Libor + 250 
basis points; if 6.5 > D/A ≥  6 then Libor + 225 basis points; if 6 > D/A ≥  5.5 then Libor 
+ 200 basis points; if 5.5 > D/A ≥  5 then Libor + 175 basis points; if D/A < 5 then Libor 
+ 150 basis points. All twelve members of the syndicate participated in this tranche of the 
deal.  
 
Term Loan A maturing on 31 July, 2007, in the amount of $100 million. This tranche was 
priced similar to the revolving line of credit. All twelve members of the syndicate 
participated in this tranche of the deal. 
 
Term Loan B maturing on 31 Jan, 2008, in the amount of $100 million. This tranche was 
also priced based on D/A as follows: if D/A ≥  5.5 then Libor + 275 basis points, 
otherwise Libor + 250 basis points. Only three members of the syndicate (Goldman 
Sachs, Union Bank, and Chase Manhattan) participated in this tranche.  
 
Term Loan C maturing on 31 Jan, 2008, in the amount of $90 million. Only Goldman 
Sachs participated in this tranche, which was priced the same as term loan B, but was an 
add-on term loan to back the company’s repurchase of a high-yield bond. 
 
Goldman Sachs was the lead arranger in the deal because it had a prior relationship with the 
borrowing firm. It had also underwritten public debt for Classic Cable earlier in the month. 
Goldman Sachs kept the riskiest tranche of the loan deal in its own portfolio, presumably to 
avoid moral hazard issues. As implied by our theory, Goldman Sachs, an investment bank with 
lower levels of risk aversion compared with the majority of the other lenders in the deal, 
participated in the riskier tranches of the loan deal, namely term loan B and term loan C.  
  
The dependent variable in our study is the all-in-spread drawn (AIS). The Dealscan item AIS 
captures the interest rate that the borrower pays the lender for the amount drawn on the loan. It is 
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calculated as the coupon spread plus the annual fee, and it is expressed in basis points.27 At the 
deal-level data, when a loan deal has several tranches, LPC calculates the AIS for the loan deal 
as the weighted average of the spreads for each tranche, where the weight is the amount of the 
loan in that tranche relative to the total amount of that loan. However, because we use tranche-
level data, the AIS measure in our study is not the weighted average of the spread for each 
tranche. In our study, each tranche of a multi-tranche loan deal can have a different AIS measure 
depending on the commitment fee, annual fee, and interest rate charged on the tranche.  
 
We use the following explanatory variables in our study. Similar specifications have been used 
by Mei, Angbazo, and Saunders (1998), Dennis and Nandy (2000), Yi and Mullineaux (2006), 
and Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi (2006).  
 
L_SALES: The log of the annual sales of the borrower. 
L_AMT: The log of the loan amount of the tranche. 
TICKER_Y_N: A dummy variable that takes unit value if the borrower has a ticker 
symbol. 
SECURE: A dummy variable that takes unit value if the loan is secured. 
M_S: A dummy variable that takes unit value if the loan maturity is one year or less. 
M_I: A dummy variable that takes unit value if the loan maturity is five years or less but 
more than a year. 
R1 thru R9: A set of dummy variables taking unit value for a company senior debt credit 
rating of C, CC, CCC, B and so on and 0 otherwise. R9 measures the highest possible 
rating of AAA. 
TRANCH:  A dummy variable that takes unit value if the loan deal has more than one 
tranche. 
REVOLVE: A dummy variable that takes unit value if the loan tranche is a revolving 
loan and zero otherwise.28 
S1: A dummy variable that takes unit value if the loan tranche is senior.29 
                                                 
27 The coupon spread is quoted over LIBOR for most of the loans. For loans not quoted against LIBOR, the 
differentials used in the AIS reported in the LPC data set are as follows: +205 basis points for the prime rate, -19 
basis points for the commercial paper rate, -125 basis points for the Treasury-Bill rate, -25 basis points for the 
federal funds rate, -12 basis points for the banker’s acceptance rate, and -9 basis points for the rates on negotiable 
certificates of deposit. Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (2002) find that replacing these constants with time-varying 
differentials based on year-specific average spreads has minimal impact.  
28 A loan tranche is considered to be a revolver if the loan type is 364 day facility, Revolver/Line < 1 Yr, 
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr, Revolver/Term Loan, Bridge Loan, Demand Loan, Guidance Line (Uncommitted), Limited 
Line, Multi-Option Facility, or Standby Letter of Credit.  
 
29 LPC categorizes loans into the following five categories based on seniority: senior, senior-subordinated, 
mezzanine, junior-subordinated, and subordinated. 
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YEAR: A set of dummy variables equal to 1 for years 1990 through 1998. 1999 is the 
excluded year. We also have a dummy variable to capture all loans made prior to 1990. 
 
 
In our database the $365 million loan deal of Classic Cable is recorded in four observations: the 
revolving loan, term loan A, term loan B, and term loan C. Each of these four observations 
would have the same deal amount of $365 million. The observation for the revolving loan would 
have a loan amount of $75 million and the observation for term loan A would have a loan 
amount of $100 million. Each observation would have a unit value for the TRANCH variable 
indicating that each observation represents a tranche of a multi-tranche loan deal. Only those 
tranches with collateral would have a unit value for the SECURE variable. 
 
We present descriptive statistics for our data in Table 2.1. Of the 23,721 loan observations, 52% 
were a part of a multi-tranche loan deal. This implies that 11,325 (48%) were single-tranche 
loans. The largest syndicated loan deal in our sample was for $20 billion and the smallest was for 
$500,000. The average credit spread per tranche was 187 basis points. The borrowers of a 
majority of the loans had a senior debt rating of BBB, BB, or B. Of the loan tranches in our 
sample, 73% were revolving loans and 51% had a maturity of five years or less but more than 
one year. The deal with the largest number of lenders had 88 participating banks in the syndicate. 
The borrower with the smallest sales had only $200,000 of sales in the year prior to the loan, 
while the borrower with the highest sales had almost $274 billion of sales in the year prior to the 
loan. About 77% of the tranches were secured.  
 
In Table 2.2 we compare the descriptive statistics of loan tranches that were a part of a multi-
tranche loan deal with those of single-tranche loans. We note that, as expected, the average deal 
amount of tranched loans is almost twice that of non-tranched. Borrowers taking tranched loans 
are less likely to have ticker symbols. About 85% of the observations that are a part of multi-
tranche loan deal are secured as compared with only 63% of non-tranched loans. Since loans to 
risky borrowers are more likely to be secured, this suggests that loans to riskier firms are more 
likely to be tranched. This is consistent with our hypothesis that riskier firms have more 
incentive to use tranched syndicated loans. Consistent with our third hypothesis, the average AIS 
of a tranche of a multi-tranche loan deal is about 216 basis points over the LIBOR, whereas the 
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average AIS of a non-tranched loan is 147 basis points. Table 2.2 also shows that borrowers 
rated BB or lower are more likely to have multiple tranches in their loan deal than those rated 
BBB or higher. Tranched loans are also less likely to have short maturities and more likely to be 
senior loans.  
 
We also note that only 56% of the tranched loans are revolving loans, compared with 92.5% of 
the non-tranched loans. This observation also is consistent with our model, which implies that 
BLCs that justify a return less than the reservation return of non-banks are not tranched. The 
average credit spread on revolving loans is lower than that on term loans.30 Additionally, 
commercial banks are more likely to lead and participate in non-tranched loans. They have 
access to deposits as a source of funds and are therefore better suited to make revolving loans 
(Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi, 2006).31 In Table 2.3 we compare the descriptive statistics of 
revolving loan tranches with those of term loan tranches. Consistent with our earlier observation, 
only 43% of the revolving loans in our sample were part of a multi-tranche loan deal, but 88% of 
the term loans in our sample were part of a multi-tranche loan deal. Borrowers of 55% of the 
revolving loan tranches in our sample were public companies, but only 44% of the term loan 
borrowers were public companies. The average maturity of term loan tranches was 5.77 years, 
compared with 3.93 years for revolving loan tranches. A higher proportion of term-loan 
borrowers had a senior debt rating of BB or lower. A higher percentage of borrowers of 
revolving loan tranches had investment grade ratings for their senior debt. Term-loan borrowers 
showed average sales that were less than half the average sales of borrowers using revolving-
loan tranches. Our data suggest that revolving loan tranches are likely to be less risky than term 
loans because revolvers are made to public firms, with bigger sales size, better debt rating, and 
relatively short-term maturity. Hence, they justify lower returns. We find that the average AIS 
for revolving loans was only 163 basis points in our sample, compared with an average AIS of 
246 basis points for term loans.  
                                                 
30 Table 3 shows that the average credit spread on revolving loans is 163 basis points, compared with average credit 
spread of 246 basis points on term loans.  
 
31 Large corporations use revolving lines of credit for commercial paper backup. At the times of liquidity crisis when 
corporations cannot roll over their existing commercial papers, they access their lines of credit from the commercial 
banks. The banking literature has established that precisely during liquidity crisis commercial banks have larger 
inflows of deposits, and they are therefore able to meet the liquidity needs of the corporations.  
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Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the results of regressions of AIS on borrower and loan characteristics. 
We perform separate regressions for loan tranches that were made to borrowers with senior debt 
ratings and those made to unrated borrowers. The parameter estimate of the TRANCH 
coefficient in Table 2.4 suggests that tranches of loans to rated borrowers have 17.83 basis points 
higher cost than non-tranched loans, other things equal. Similarly, the parameter estimate of the 
TRANCH coefficient in Table 2.5 suggests that tranches to unrated borrowers have 23.72 basis 
points higher cost of borrowing than non-tranched loans. However, these regressions assume that 
the decision to divide a loan into multiple tranches is exogenous. We have argued that the 
decision to tranche depends on loan and borrower characteristics and is therefore endogenous. 
Our theory suggests that high-risk borrowers who face higher AIS are more likely to take 
tranched syndicated loans than are low-risk borrowers.32 Hence, the coefficient estimates of these 
regressions are potentially misleading. 
 
To account for this selection problem, we run two-stage least squares regressions for rated and 
unrated loans. We first calculate the probability that a loan will be tranched based on borrower 
and loan characteristics. We then use this predicted probability of tranching to create a dummy 
variable PT that takes a unit value if the predicted probability is higher than a designated cut-off 
level. We then use PT as an independent variable to ascertain the effect of tranching on the 
pricing of syndicated loans. Tables 2.6 and 2.8 show the results of our logistic procedure to 
predict the probability that a tranche is a part of a multi-tranche loan deal.  
 
Consistent with our expectations, Table 2.6 suggests that risky loans are more likely to be 
tranched. We get positive coefficient estimates for dummy variables indicating a senior debt 
rating of BB and lower but negative coefficients for dummy variables for senior debt rating 
indicators of BBB, A, and AA. The AAA rating is the excluded category in our regression. We 
get negative coefficient estimates for dummy variables for short-term loans and intermediate-
maturity loans. We also get a negative coefficient estimate for the revolving loan dummy. These 
estimates suggest that revolving loans and loans with maturity of fewer than five years are less 
                                                 
32 As observed in earlier studies, the results in Table IV show that secured loans are priced 64.60 basis points higher 
than nonsecured loans. This is also because loans to high risk borrowers who face higher AIS are more likely to be 
secured than otherwise. 
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likely to be tranched. We get a significant negative coefficient for the log of borrower’s sales 
size. This suggests that loans to borrowers with higher sales are less likely to be tranched. As 
expected, we get significant positive coefficient for the log of deal amount, suggesting that large 
loans are more likely to be tranched. In Table 2.8 we find similarly signed coefficients for loan 
tranches made to unrated borrowers. We find significant negative coefficient for sales size, short-
term maturity, intermediate-maturity, and revolving loans and significant positive coefficient for 
deal amount. 
 
In Table 2.7 and Table 2.9 we show the marginal probabilities that loans made to rated and 
unrated borrowers will be tranched, respectively. In Table 2.7 we show that the predicted 
probability that an actual revolving loan made to Chiquita Brands International in 1996 would be 
a part of a multi-tranche loan deal was about 34%.33 The amount of this deal was $125 million, 
and Chiquita had sales of $2,533 million in the prior year. Chiquita is a public company and had 
a senior debt rating of B, while the maturity of the revolving loan was less than five years. 
However, if the company had taken a $250 million loan rather than $125 million loan, our 
predicted probability of tranching would have increased by 18.7% to 52.5%. If Chiquita were to 
have had a senior debt rating of AAA instead of B, the probability of the revolving loan being a 
part of a $125 million multi-tranche loan deal rather than being a stand-alone $125 million 
revolving loan would have decreased by 17.8% to 16%. If the loan in question had been a term 
loan rather than a revolving loan, then the probability of tranching would have increased to 
79.5% for this loan. In Table 2.9 we show that the predicted probability of tranching of a 
hypothetical $125 million revolving loan with a maturity of five years or less made in 1996 to a 
private company with sales of $2,500 million was 34.3%. However, if this deal amount were 
$250 million, the probability of tranching rises to 43.7%. If the loan in question were a term loan 
instead of a revolving loan, the probability of tranching increases to 83.1%.  
 
Based on the coefficient estimates from our logistic regressions, we can predict the probability a 
loan will be a part of multi-tranche loan deal. However, we need to predict the value of the 
TRANCH variable. Therefore, we find a cutoff level of probability such that the number of loans 
                                                 
33Based on our logistic regression we predicted the probability to be only 33.8% that this loan would be a part of 
multi-tranche loan deal and in the real world this actual loan was not a part of a multi-tranche loan deal.  
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in our sample with a predicted probability of tranching greater than that cutoff level is the same 
as the number of loans that were actually a part of a tranched loan.34 For syndicated loans to 
rated borrowers we find that at a cutoff level of 40.5%, the number of loans predicted to be a part 
of multi-tranche loan deal is the same as the actual number of loans that were a part of such 
deals. For loans to unrated borrowers, we find the cutoff level is 29.5%. 
 
In Table 2.10 we present the results of our regression of AIS on PT (the predicted value of the 
TRANCH variable) and other borrower and loan characteristics. PT takes a unit value for loans 
with predicted probability of tranching greater than the cutoff level of 40.5% in this regression. 
We find that the coefficient estimate for PT in panel A of Table 2.10 is significantly different 
from the coefficient estimate of TRANCH in Table 2.4. In Table 2.4 we found a significant, 
positive coefficient estimate for the TRANCH variable suggesting that loans that are part of 
multi-tranche loan deal have higher cost than non-tranched loans. After accounting for the 
endogeneity of the tranching decision, we find that tranched loans have 8.44 basis points lower 
cost of borrowing. This provides positive evidence in support of our first hypothesis that the total 
cost of borrowing for a tranched loan is lower than an otherwise identical non-tranched loan. 
Given that the average deal amount for a syndicated loan is $382.35 million and the average 
maturity of a syndicated loan is 4.86 years, a decrease of AIS by 8.44 basis points amounts to 
savings of over $1.5 million in borrowing costs over the life of an average loan. The AIS on a 
loan made to a borrower with senior debt rating of AA is only 9.07 basis points higher than on an 
otherwise identical loan made to a borrower of AAA rating. In other words, an 8.44 basis points 
decrease in borrowing costs in light of tranching effectively lowers the cost of borrowing for 
AA-rated firms to that of AAA-rated firms.  
 
The coefficient estimates for other variables in our regression are in line with the results of 
earlier studies. The coefficient estimate for the SECURE variable suggests that collateralized 
loans are priced 67.64 basis points higher than unsecured loans. Revolving loans are priced 38.7 
basis points lower than term loans. Loans to firms with higher credit ratings have lower credit 
spreads. A loan made to a borrower with a senior debt rating of B has a credit spread that is 141 
basis points higher than the credit spread on otherwise identical loan made to a firm with AAA 
                                                 
34 Palepu (1986) highlights the pitfalls related to using arbitrary cutoff levels. 
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rating. We capture year-fixed effects in our regression to account for the prevailing interest rate 
environment and other year-specific factors.  
 
In panel B of Table 2.10, we capture the individual impact of tranching on the pricing of loans to 
borrowers with different senior debt ratings. We interact the PT variable with each of the dummy 
variables for different senior debt ratings. Our second hypothesis states that the benefits of 
tranching accrue primarily to risky borrowers. We note that the coefficient estimates for the 
interaction of the PT variable with the dummy variables for senior debt ratings of CCC, B, and 
BB are significantly negative. Our results suggest that the borrowing costs for a firm with a 
senior debt rating of CCC are 109.83 basis points lower for a multi-tranche loan than the 
borrowing costs for an otherwise identical non-tranched loan.35 Similarly, tranching decreases 
the cost of borrowing for B-rated borrowers and BB-rated borrowers by 21.59 basis points and 
15.72 basis points, respectively. We do not find negative coefficients for the interaction of PT 
with other investment-grade rating dummies.36 This shows that the benefits of tranching accrue 
to borrowing firms with speculative grade ratings. As the borrower’s credit risk increases, the 
benefits of tranching to the borrower also increase. In Table 2.11 we show the results of 
regressing AIS on the predicted value of TRANCH for unrated borrowers. The coefficient 
estimate for PT suggests that among unrated firms the credit spread on a tranched loan is 28.26 
basis points lower than an otherwise identical non-tranched loan. Strahan (1999) shows that loan 
prices to unrated borrowers are similar to those to borrowers with speculative grade ratings. Our 
results also show that the beneficial pricing impact of tranching to unrated firms is similar to the 
benefits to borrowers with speculative grade ratings.  
 
Theory and data suggest that revolving loans are less likely to be tranched, but tranched loan 
deals usually have a revolving facility. Our model suggests that revolving loans that are a part of 
multi-tranche loan deal should have a lower credit spread when compared with otherwise 
                                                 
35 We do not have an interaction term between PT and rating dummies for CC and C in our regression because all 
loans to CC- and C-rated borrowers in our sample had a unit value for PT.  
 
36 We find a significant positive coefficient for the interaction term of PT and rating A dummy. The positive 
coefficient by itself does not contradict any of our hypotheses. According to our model, the benefits of tranching 
accrue to all BLCs that justify a return higher than the reservation return of non-banks. According to our model, all 
BLCs with low credit risk should not be tranched. However, if they are tranched then the credit spread on such 
BLCs can be higher than on non-tranched loans. 
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identical revolving loans. Hence, we test the robustness of our results on a subsample containing 
revolving loans only. We first regress the AIS of revolving loans on TRANCH and other loan 
and variable characteristics. In Table 2.12 we show the regression results for revolving loans 
made to borrowers with senior debt ratings. As expected, we find a significant positive 
coefficient, suggesting that revolving loans that are a part of a multi-tranche loan have 20.60 
basis points higher cost of borrowing than otherwise identical non-tranched revolving loans. In 
Table 2.16 we show similar regression results for revolving loans made to unrated borrowers. 
However, the coefficient estimates in Table 2.12 and Table 2.16 do not account for endogeneity 
of the tranching decision and can therefore be misleading. Hence, in Tables 2.13 and 2.17 we 
predict the probability a revolving loan will be a part of a multi-tranche loan. We find that the 
sign and significance of the coefficient estimates for different loan and borrower characteristics 
in Tables 2.13 and 2.17 are similar to those of Tables 2.6 and 2.8. We do not find any notable 
differences in the magnitude of the coefficient estimates. In Tables 2.14 and 2.18 we present the 
marginal probability of a revolving loan being a part of a multi-tranche loan deal to borrowers 
with senior debt rating and to unrated borrowers, respectively. For revolvers to rated borrowers, 
we find that at a cutoff level of 43.5%, the number of loans with estimated probability of 
tranching greater than this cutoff level is the same as the number of actual loans with unit value 
for TRANCH. We find the cutoff level is 39% for revolving loans made to unrated borrowers. 
We calculate the value of PT based on the appropriate cutoff levels, and in Tables 2.15 and 2.19 
we report the results of our regression of AIS on PT and other loan and borrower characteristics 
for revolving loans made to rated borrowers and to unrated borrowers, respectively. Our results 
suggest that, for rated borrowers, the credit spread on a revolving loan that was a part of a multi-
tranche loan was 6.95 basis points lower than an otherwise identical revolving loan. For the 
unrated borrowers, revolving loans that were a part of a multi-tranche loan deal were priced 
24.09 basis points lower than otherwise identical non-tranched revolvers.  
 
In our study we have used cutoff levels such that the number of firms with the predicted 
probability of tranching greater than the cutoff level is equal to the number of loans that actually 
had a unit value for TRANCH in the relevant sample. However, common sense dictates that 
loans that had more than 50% probability of being a part of a multi-tranche loan deal should be 
estimated to have a unit value for the TRANCH variable, and those loans with lower than 50% 
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probability should have a zero value for TRANCH. Hence, in Table 2.20 we use 50% as the 
cutoff level to estimate the value of PT and regress the AIS on PT and other loan and borrower 
characteristics. We find that all our results remain qualitatively the same. We find a significant 
positive coefficient for PT in columns II and III, indicating that tranching results in lower credit 
spreads for both rated and unrated borrowers. The coefficient estimates in column I suggest that 
the benefits of tranching accrue primarily to borrowers with speculative grade ratings.  
 
Hao, Nandy, and Roberts (2005) use a dummy variable for covenants at the tranche level arguing 
that the inclusion of covenants in a loan tranche requires the borrower to release detailed 
financial and/or accounting information to the lenders on a regular basis which may in turn affect 
the loan price. Hence we also include a dummy variable for covenants in our regression, but find 
that adding this variable does not alter our results (results unreported).  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The literature on syndicated loans has ignored the phenomenon of tranching, even though over 
45% of all syndicated loans have tranches. This chapter recognizes the importance of tranching 
and shows why it is an integral component of many syndicated loan structures. We present a 
theory to explain the economic value of tranching and show that riskier firms are more likely to 
take loans with multiple tranches. Therefore, the average credit spread on a syndicated loan with 
multiple tranches is higher than that on a non-tranched loan. However, after accounting for the 
risk characteristics of a tranched loan, we show empirically that borrowings that are part of 
tranched loans have lower credit spreads than otherwise identical non-tranched loans. We also 
show that the benefits of tranching accrue primarily to risky borrowers. We find our results are 
robust to alternative specifications.  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics – Syndicated Loans 
 
Variable Label N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0   23,721           0.53            0.50              -                  1.00 
D_amt Loan deal amount (millions)   23,721      382.35       811.37         0.50     20,000.00 
Tranch 1 if loan was tranched; 0 otherwise   23,721           0.52            0.50              -                  1.00 
Maturity Maturity of the loan tranche (years)   20,906           4.86            2.79              -             35.00 
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise   12,399           0.77            0.42              -                  1.00 
AIS All-in-spread drawn   19,080      187.37       115.68         2.33        1,480.00 
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C   23,721           0.00            0.02              -                  1.00 
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC   23,721           0.00            0.04              -                  1.00 
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC   23,721           0.01            0.09              -                  1.00 
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B   23,721           0.11            0.31              -                  1.00 
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB   23,721           0.10            0.30              -                  1.00 
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB   23,721           0.08            0.27              -                  1.00 
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A   23,721           0.05            0.21              -                  1.00 
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA   23,721           0.01            0.11              -                  1.00 
r9 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AAA   23,721           0.00            0.05              -                 1.00 
unrated 1 if borrower's senior debt is not rated   23,721           0.63            0.48              -                  1.00 
revolve 1 if loan tranche is a revolver; 0 otherwise   21,602           0.73            0.45              -                  1.00 
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year   20,906           0.11            0.32              -                  1.00 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs   20,906           0.51            0.50              -                  1.00 
s1 1 if the loan is senior; 0 otherwise   21,471           0.98            0.15              -                  1.00 
lenders Number of lenders participating in tranche   23,721           8.22            8.88         2.00             88.00 
sales Borrower's sales in prior year (millions)   18,568   1,912.74    6,915.14         0.20   273,834.00 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics – Tranched vs. Non-Tranched Loans 
 
  Tranched Loans  Non-Tranched Loans  Diff of Means 
Variable Label N Mean Std Dev   N Mean Std Dev   t-stat   
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0   12,396         0.502           0.50      11,325         0.551           0.50            -7.56 * 
D_amt Loan deal amount (millions)   12,396      497.93      983.12      11,325      255.84      538.89           23.78 * 
Maturity Maturity of the loan tranche (years)   11,636         5.058           2.49        9,270         4.612           3.12           11.20 * 
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise     7,826         0.848           0.36        4,573         0.629           0.48           26.60 * 
AIS All-in-spread drawn   11,138      215.93      109.21        7,942      147.32      112.58           42.02 * 
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C   12,396         0.001           0.03      11,325         0.000           0.01             3.00 * 
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC   12,396         0.002           0.04      11,325         0.001           0.03             1.75  
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC   12,396         0.011           0.10      11,325         0.007           0.08             3.32 * 
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B   12,396         0.136           0.34      11,325         0.083           0.28           13.15 * 
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB   12,396         0.106           0.31      11,325         0.099           0.30             1.67  
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB   12,396         0.059           0.23      11,325         0.104           0.30         -12.66 * 
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A   12,396         0.038           0.19      11,325         0.058           0.23            -7.21 * 
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA   12,396         0.009           0.09      11,325         0.014           0.12            -3.67 * 
r9 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AAA   12,396         0.002           0.04      11,325         0.002           0.05            -0.88  
unrated 1 if borrower's senior debt is not rated   12,396         0.637           0.48      11,325         0.632           0.48             0.88  
revolve 1 if loan tranche is a revolver; 0 otherwise   11,919         0.563           0.50        9,683         0.925           0.26         -68.83 * 
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year   11,636         0.093           0.29        9,270         0.139           0.35         -10.28 * 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs   11,636         0.450           0.50        9,270         0.576           0.49         -18.30 * 
s1 1 if the loan is senior; 0 otherwise   11,486         0.998           0.05        9,985         0.956           0.20           19.64 * 
lenders Number of lenders participating in tranche   12,396         9.700         10.10     11,325         6.590           6.97          27.80 * 
sales Borrower's sales in prior year (millions)     9,698   1,718.40   5,934.44       8,870   2,125.20   7,843.22           -3.96 * 
 
* significant at 5% level 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics – Revolvers vs. Term Loans 
 
  Revolving Loans  Term Loans  Diff of Means 
Variable Label N Mean Std Dev   N Mean Std Dev   t-stat   
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0   15,665         0.551           0.50        5,937         0.441           0.50           14.52 * 
D_amt Loan deal amount (millions)   15,665      405.70      877.07        5,937      383.87      737.57             1.84  
Tranch 1 if loan was tranched; 0 otherwise   15,665         0.428           0.49        5,937         0.878           0.33         -77.61 * 
Maturity Maturity of the loan tranche (years)   13,579         3.930           2.17        5,459         5.773           2.29         -50.92 * 
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise     8,037         0.714           0.45        3,784         0.932           0.25         -33.71 * 
AIS All-in-spread drawn   13,315    163.062      112.20        5,477    245.990         98.34         -50.36 * 
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C   15,665         0.000           0.02        5,937         0.001           0.03            -1.30  
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC   15,665         0.001           0.04        5,937         0.002           0.04            -0.92  
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC   15,665         0.006           0.08        5,937         0.014           0.12            -4.88 * 
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B   15,665         0.079           0.27        5,937         0.165           0.37         -16.30 * 
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB   15,665         0.093           0.29        5,937         0.113           0.32            -4.12 * 
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB   15,665         0.100           0.30        5,937         0.037           0.19           18.49 * 
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A   15,665         0.065           0.25        5,937         0.011           0.10           22.78 * 
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA   15,665         0.016           0.12        5,937         0.002           0.04           12.44 * 
r9 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AAA   15,665         0.003           0.06        5,937         0.000           0.01             6.21 * 
unrated 1 if borrower's senior debt is not rated   15,665         0.636           0.48        5,937         0.656           0.48            -2.69 * 
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year   13,579         0.161           0.37        5,459         0.032           0.18           32.74 * 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs   13,579         0.616           0.49        5,459         0.363           0.48           32.60 * 
s1 1 if the loan is senior; 0 otherwise   14,007         0.998           0.05        5,491         0.998           0.04            -0.56  
lenders Number of lenders participating in tranche   15,665         8.490           8.94       5,937         8.820           9.49           -2.32 * 
sales Borrower's sales in prior year (millions)   12,414   2,268.61   7,779.19       4,409   1,075.57   4,086.02          12.82   
 
* significant at 5% level 
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Table 2.4: Regression Results for AIS Based on Tranching of Syndicated Loans to Firms with Senior Debt Rating 
 
Variable Label Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
intercept Intercept       226.34          30.50           7.42 <.0001 
Tranch 1 if loan was tranched; 0 otherwise         17.83            2.51           7.11 <.0001 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year          -7.08           0.84          -8.42 <.0001 
secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise         64.60            3.38         19.13 <.0001 
revolve 1 if loan tranche is a revolver; 0 otherwise       -32.01           2.55       -12.56 <.0001 
tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0          -1.37           2.19          -0.62 0.5327 
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C       272.08          34.71           7.84 <.0001 
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC       176.65          27.17           6.50 <.0001 
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC       180.37          24.56           7.34 <.0001 
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B       140.57          23.91           5.88 <.0001 
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB         95.14          23.82           3.99 <.0001 
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB         47.49          23.74           2.00 0.0455 
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A         24.22          23.84           1.02 0.3096 
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA           9.56          24.91           0.38 0.7013 
y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise         30.13          14.21           2.12 0.034 
y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise       -17.93         11.55          -1.55 0.1206 
y92 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise       -32.38           9.38          -3.45 0.0006 
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise       -28.21           5.64          -5.00 <.0001 
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise       -32.91           4.82          -6.83 <.0001 
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise       -42.97           4.33          -9.93 <.0001 
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise       -38.34           4.21          -9.11 <.0001 
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise       -43.47           3.68       -11.80 <.0001 
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise       -52.20           3.31       -15.77 <.0001 
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise       -42.19           3.26       -12.94 <.0001 
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year           4.14            4.11           1.01 0.3138 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs           0.33            2.45           0.13 0.8934 
N=4282                                 R-squared = .6235                                   F-value = 284.59 
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Table 2.5: Regression Results for AIS Based on Tranching of Syndicated Loans to Firms without Senior Debt 
Rating 
 
Variable Label Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
intercept Intercept       418.43          20.03         20.89 <.0001 
Tranch 1 if loan was tranched; 0 otherwise         23.72            2.94           8.06 <.0001 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year       -13.31           0.96       -13.86 <.0001 
secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise       100.45            3.53         28.49 <.0001 
revolve 1 if loan tranche is a revolver; 0 otherwise       -37.85           3.16       -11.96 <.0001 
tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0       -17.80           2.65          -6.72 <.0001 
y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise           0.09            5.42           0.02 0.9867 
y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise       -16.27           7.53          -2.16 0.0308 
 Y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise         27.79            7.82           3.55 0.0004 
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise           0.11            6.75           0.02 0.9864 
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise       -17.32           6.12          -2.83 0.0047 
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise       -26.88           5.66          -4.75 <.0001 
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise       -35.34           5.47          -6.46 <.0001 
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise       -30.06           5.01          -6.00 <.0001 
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise       -58.57           4.91       -11.94 <.0001 
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise       -37.55           5.21          -7.21 <.0001 
M_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year         53.85            4.97         10.83 <.0001 
M_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs         13.09            2.94           4.45 <.0001 
N=5431                                 R-squared = .3055                                   F-value = 141.53 
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Table 2.6: Logistic Regression to Predict Probability of Tranching in Syndicated Loans to Firms with Senior Debt 
Rating 
Parameter Label Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept Intercept       -13.11           0.81       260.17 <.0001 
l_d_amt Natural log of the deal amount           1.12           0.04       737.14 <.0001 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0           0.00           0.07           0.00 0.9635 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year          -0.31           0.03       116.75 <.0001 
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C         12.37       266.40           0.00 0.963 
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC           1.32           0.59           5.05 0.0246 
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC           0.90           0.42           4.44 0.035 
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B           1.05           0.36           8.29 0.004 
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB           0.12           0.36           0.11 0.7393 
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB          -0.70           0.35           3.86 0.0496 
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A          -0.48           0.36           1.80 0.1796 
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA          -0.74           0.38           3.82 0.0508 
y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise           0.26           0.31           0.69 0.4056 
y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise          -0.94           0.24         15.51 <.0001 
y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise          -0.49           0.21           5.40 0.0201 
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise           0.10           0.16           0.35 0.5557 
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise          -0.12           0.14           0.83 0.3632 
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise           0.03           0.12           0.06 0.8001 
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise           0.08           0.12           0.44 0.5086 
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise          -0.17           0.12           2.07 0.1499 
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise          -0.25           0.11           5.34 0.0208 
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise           0.04           0.11           0.14 0.7046 
M_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year          -0.28           0.11           7.23 0.0072 
M_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs          -0.48           0.08         38.79 <.0001 
revolve 1 if loan tranche is a revolver; 0 otherwise          -2.03           0.10       421.39 <.0001 
N=6641                                 Likelihood Ratio = 2677.27                             Wald Stats = 1450.19 
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Table 2.7: Marginal Probability of Tranching in Syndicated Loans to Firms with Senior Debt Rating 
 
  Base Value* Change to  
New 
Probability  
change in 
Probability 
     
Deal amount (millions) 125 250 52.5% 18.7% 
Ticker symbol Y N 33.7% -0.1% 
Sales size (millions) 2533 5000 29.3% -4.5% 
Rating B AAA 16.0% -17.8% 
Year 1996 1999 37.7% 3.9% 
Maturity (years) 1<x<=5 >5 45.3% 11.5% 
Loan type Revolving Fixed term 79.5% 45.7% 
     
Probability of being a tranche 
of multi-tranche loan at base 
value 33.80%       
 
*Base values are for an actual loan made to Chiquita Brands International. The actual loan was not tranched. 
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Table 2.8: Logistic Regression to Predict Probability of Tranching in Syndicated Loans to Firms  
without Senior Debt Rating 
Parameter Label Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept Intercept          -2.87           0.47         38.03 <.0001 
L_d_amt Natural log of the deal amount           0.57           0.03       387.85 <.0001 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0          -0.22           0.05         18.87 <.0001 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year          -0.25           0.02       136.90 <.0001 
y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise          -0.41           0.10         15.69 <.0001 
y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise          -0.46           0.13         11.65 0.0006 
y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise          -0.21           0.14           2.06 0.151 
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise          -0.61           0.14         19.42 <.0001 
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise          -0.40           0.12         11.06 0.0009 
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise          -0.28           0.11           6.39 0.0115 
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise          -0.49           0.11         19.11 <.0001 
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise          -0.35           0.11         10.79 0.001 
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise          -0.46           0.10         19.70 <.0001 
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise          -0.47           0.11         18.32 <.0001 
M_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year          -0.25           0.09           7.79 0.0052 
M_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs          -0.39           0.06         42.51 <.0001 
revolve 1 if loan tranche is a revolver; 0 otherwise          -2.24           0.08       883.36 <.0001 
N=8,730                                 Likelihood Ratio = 2616.16                             Wald Stats = 1445.13 
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Table 2.9: Marginal Probability of Tranching in Syndicated Loans to Firms without Senior Debt Rating 
 
 
  Base Value Change to  
New 
Probability  
change in 
Probability 
     
Deal amount (millions) 125 250 43.7% 9.4% 
Ticker symbol N Y 29.5% -4.8% 
Sales size (millions) 2500 5000 30.5% -3.8% 
Year 1996 1999 42.6% 8.3% 
Maturity (years) 1<x<=5 >5 43.5% 9.2% 
Loan type Revolving Fixed term 83.1% 48.8% 
     
Probability of being a tranche 
of multi-tranche loan at base 
value 34.30%       
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Table 2.10: Regressions for AIS Based on Predicted Tranching for Syndicated Loans to Rated Firms  
Panel A 
Variable Label Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept       230.38          30.67           7.51 <.0001 
Pt 1 if probability of tranching > .405; Else 0          -8.44           2.88          -2.93 0.0034 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year          -6.04           0.85          -7.13 <.0001 
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise         67.64            3.37         20.10 <.0001 
revolve 1 if loan tranche is a revolver; 0 otherwise       -38.70           2.52       -15.34 <.0001 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0          -1.27           2.20          -0.58 0.5636 
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C       275.88          34.87           7.91 <.0001 
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC       179.49          27.30           6.57 <.0001 
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC       180.26          24.69           7.30 <.0001 
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B       141.06          24.02           5.87 <.0001 
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB         94.27          23.94           3.94 <.0001 
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB         43.94          23.88           1.84 0.0659 
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A         22.06          23.97           0.92 0.3573 
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA           9.07          25.04           0.36 0.7173 
y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise         35.84          14.28           2.51 0.0121 
y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise       -27.06         11.66          -2.32 0.0203 
y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise       -39.39           9.44          -4.17 <.0001 
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise       -29.97           5.68          -5.28 <.0001 
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise       -37.04           4.87          -7.61 <.0001 
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise       -44.37           4.35       -10.19 <.0001 
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise       -39.67           4.23          -9.38 <.0001 
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise       -44.46           3.70       -12.01 <.0001 
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise       -53.33           3.33       -16.03 <.0001 
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise       -42.09           3.28       -12.85 <.0001 
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year           1.76            4.14           0.42 0.6714 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs          -4.69           2.49          -1.88 0.0602 
N=4282                                 R-squared = .6198                                   F-value = 280.16 
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Panel B 
 
 
Variable Label Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept       231.94         30.55           7.59 <.0001
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year          -6.17           0.84          -7.31 <.0001
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise         66.77           3.35         19.94 <.0001
revolve 1 if loan tranche is a revolver; 0 otherwise       -40.05           2.52       -15.89 <.0001
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0          -0.86           2.19          -0.39 0.6937
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C       271.68         34.66           7.84 <.0001
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC       176.67         27.14           6.51 <.0001
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC       271.97         28.53           9.53 <.0001
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B       157.00         24.33           6.45 <.0001
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB       104.79         24.05           4.36 <.0001
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB         44.62         23.85           1.87 0.0615
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A         12.85         24.26           0.53 0.5962
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA           7.25         26.89           0.27 0.7875
tr3 1 if r3=1 and probability of tranching > .405     -109.83         17.07          -6.43 <.0001
tr4 1 if r4=1 and probability of tranching > .405       -21.59           5.67          -3.81 0.0001
tr5 1 if r5=1 and probability of tranching > .405       -15.72           4.80          -3.27 0.0011
tr6 1 if r6=1 and probability of tranching > .405           1.71           4.95           0.35 0.7292
tr7 1 if r7=1 and probability of tranching > .405         16.47           7.44           2.21 0.0269
tr8 1 if r8=1 and probability of tranching > .405           4.87         16.69           0.29 0.7704
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year          -2.36           4.17          -0.57 0.5709
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs          -6.84           2.51          -2.72 0.0065
N=4282                                 R-squared = .6245                               F-value = 238.33 
 
We also include year fixed effects in the regression. 
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Table 2.11: Regression Results for AIS Based on Predicted Tranching for Syndicated Loans to Firms without 
Senior Debt Rating 
Variable Label Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept       463.75          20.76         22.33 <.0001 
Pt 1 if probability of tranching > .295; Else 0       -28.26           4.75          -5.95 <.0001 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year       -12.81           0.96       -13.32 <.0001 
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise       103.88            3.50         29.71 <.0001 
revolve 1 if loan tranche is a revolver; 0 otherwise       -49.05           3.01       -16.27 <.0001 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0       -20.46           2.67          -7.66 <.0001 
Y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise          -4.77           5.45          -0.87 0.3822 
Y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise       -22.23           7.57          -2.94 0.0033 
Y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise         22.01            7.85           2.80 0.0051 
Y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise       -12.75           6.90          -1.85 0.0649 
Y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise       -22.94           6.16          -3.72 0.0002 
Y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise       -29.35           5.68          -5.17 <.0001 
Y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise       -40.59           5.51          -7.37 <.0001 
Y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise       -32.85           5.03          -6.53 <.0001 
Y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise       -62.11           4.92       -12.62 <.0001 
Y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise       -41.89           5.22          -8.02 <.0001 
M_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year         49.40            5.02           9.84 <.0001 
M_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs           7.29            2.96           2.46 0.0137 
N=5431                                 R-squared = .3018                                  F-value = 139.04 
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Table 2.12: Regression Results for AIS Based on Tranching of Revolving Syndicated Loans to Firms with Senior 
Debt Rating  
Variable Label Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept       232.33         32.40           7.17 <.0001
Tranch 1 if loan was tranched; 0 otherwise         20.60           2.62           7.86 <.0001
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year          -9.10           0.99          -9.22 <.0001
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise         60.90           3.71         16.43 <.0001
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0          -4.34           2.69          -1.61 0.1072
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C       298.30         44.60           6.69 <.0001
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC       195.80         28.68           6.83 <.0001
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC       192.87         24.92           7.74 <.0001
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B       139.88         23.66           5.91 <.0001
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB         90.97         23.52           3.87 0.0001
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB         45.32         23.41           1.94 0.053
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A         20.22         23.50           0.86 0.3895
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA         13.30         24.59           0.54 0.5887
y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise         49.20         16.29           3.02 0.0025
y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise       -10.86         12.58          -0.86 0.3878
y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise       -31.95         11.09          -2.88 0.004
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise       -18.20           6.94          -2.62 0.0088
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise       -21.33           5.68          -3.76 0.0002
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise       -37.74           5.11          -7.39 <.0001
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise       -35.91           5.04          -7.13 <.0001
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise       -43.11           4.45          -9.70 <.0001
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise       -47.34           4.12       -11.49 <.0001
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise       -38.81           4.21          -9.21 <.0001
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year         10.68           4.45           2.40 0.0163
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs           6.71           3.03           2.21 0.0269
N=2834                                 R-squared = .6117                                  F-value = 186.97 
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Table 2.13: Logistic Regression to Predict Probability of Tranching in Syndicated Revolvers to Firms with Senior 
Debt Rating 
Parameter Label Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept Intercept       -13.96           0.85       269.33 <.0001 
l_d_amt Natural log of the deal amount           1.00           0.04       541.01 <.0001 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0          -0.03           0.07           0.12 0.7251 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year          -0.25           0.03         70.76 <.0001 
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C         12.06       255.90           0.00 0.9624 
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC           1.20           0.62           3.73 0.0536 
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC           0.86           0.44           3.84 0.0499 
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B           0.86           0.37           5.46 0.0194 
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB           0.02           0.36           0.00 0.9623 
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB          -0.64           0.36           3.27 0.0704 
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A          -0.46           0.36           1.67 0.1968 
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA          -0.76           0.38           3.93 0.0473 
y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise           0.19           0.31           0.37 0.5453 
y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise          -0.98           0.26         13.71 0.0002 
y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise          -0.38           0.22           2.89 0.089 
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise           0.03           0.17           0.04 0.8454 
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise          -0.17           0.14           1.40 0.2375 
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise           0.00           0.13           0.00 0.9793 
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise           0.05           0.13           0.13 0.7135 
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise          -0.22           0.13           3.17 0.0751 
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise          -0.26           0.12           4.98 0.0257 
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise           0.01           0.11           0.01 0.9129 
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year          -0.34           0.11           9.69 0.0019 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs          -0.52           0.08         38.87 <.0001 
N=4835                                 Likelihood Ratio = 1,100.12                             Wald Stats = 796.50 
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Table 2.14: Marginal Probability of Tranching in Syndicated Revolvers to Firms with Senior Debt Rating 
 
  Base Value Change to  New Probability change in Probability
     
Deal amount (millions) 125 250 50.2% 16.7% 
Ticker symbol Y N 34.0% 0.6% 
Sales size (millions) 2533 5000 29.7% -3.7% 
Rating B AAA 17.6% -15.9% 
Year 1996 1999 38.6% 5.1% 
Maturity (years) 1<x<=5 >5 45.9% 12.4% 
     
Probability of being a tranche of 
multi-tranche loan at base value 33.42%       
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Table 2.15: Regression Results for AIS Based on Predicted Tranching for Syndicated Revolving Loans to Firms 
with Senior Debt Rating 
Variable Label Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept       223.21          32.71           6.82 <.0001 
pt 1 if probability of tranching > .435; Else 0          -6.95           2.95          -2.35 0.0187 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year          -7.65           1.01          -7.60 <.0001 
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise         64.20            3.72         17.27 <.0001 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0          -4.12           2.72          -1.51 0.1303 
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C       307.38          45.04           6.83 <.0001 
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC       200.05          28.97           6.91 <.0001 
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC       193.49          25.17           7.69 <.0001 
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B       141.03          23.90           5.90 <.0001 
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB         90.12          23.76           3.79 0.0002 
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB         42.75          23.67           1.81 0.071 
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A         18.81          23.74           0.79 0.4284 
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA         13.48          24.85           0.54 0.5874 
y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise         56.07          16.46           3.41 0.0007 
y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise       -21.34         12.79          -1.67 0.0954 
y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise       -41.09         11.23          -3.66 0.0003 
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise       -21.12           7.02          -3.01 0.0027 
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise       -27.23           5.78          -4.71 <.0001 
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise       -40.18           5.16          -7.78 <.0001 
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise       -38.23           5.09          -7.51 <.0001 
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise       -44.98           4.50       -10.00 <.0001 
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise       -49.44           4.16       -11.87 <.0001 
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise       -38.58           4.25          -9.07 <.0001 
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year           5.88            4.57           1.29 0.1982 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs          -1.43           3.22          -0.44 0.6576 
N=2834                                R-squared = .6040                                 F-value = 181.01 
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Table 2.16: Regression Results for AIS Based on Tranching of Revolving Syndicated Loans to Firms without 
Senior Debt Rating 
Variable Label Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept       392.55          23.59         16.64 <.0001 
Tranch 1 if loan was tranched; 0 otherwise         24.63            3.10           7.94 <.0001 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year       -14.16           1.14       -12.42 <.0001 
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise         98.17            3.80         25.81 <.0001 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0       -20.39           3.17          -6.44 <.0001 
y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise           9.78            6.55           1.49 0.1356 
y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise          -3.00           9.03          -0.33 0.7399 
y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise         38.14            9.59           3.97 <.0001 
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise         10.87            7.98           1.36 0.1736 
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise          -8.70           7.29          -1.19 0.2326 
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise       -23.87           6.80          -3.51 0.0004 
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise       -29.86           6.52          -4.58 <.0001 
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise       -31.94           6.04          -5.29 <.0001 
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise       -52.88           5.91          -8.95 <.0001 
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise       -34.06           6.28          -5.43 <.0001 
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year         55.91            5.52         10.13 <.0001 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs         16.62            3.70           4.49 <.0001 
N=3831                                R-squared = .3016                                 F-value = 104.36 
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Table 2.17: Logistic Regression to Predict Probability of Tranching in Syndicated Revolvers to  
Firms without Senior Debt Rating 
 
Parameter Label Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept Intercept          -4.83           0.50         92.39 <.0001 
l_d_amt Natural log of the deal amount           0.52           0.03       288.55 <.0001 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0          -0.23           0.05         17.52 <.0001 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year          -0.22           0.02         92.06 <.0001 
y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise          -0.35           0.11           9.96 0.0016 
y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise          -0.47           0.14         10.89 0.001 
y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise          -0.21           0.15           1.89 0.1688 
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise          -0.52           0.15         12.17 0.0005 
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise          -0.39           0.13           9.36 0.0022 
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise          -0.31           0.12           6.71 0.0096 
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise          -0.52           0.12         18.77 <.0001 
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise          -0.40           0.11         12.24 0.0005 
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise          -0.51           0.11         21.64 <.0001 
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise          -0.50           0.12         18.04 <.0001 
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year          -0.25           0.09           7.44 0.0064 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs          -0.47           0.07         51.23 <.0001 
N=6342                                 Likelihood Ratio = 518.29                             Wald Stats = 461.92 
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Table 2.18: Marginal Probability of Tranching in Syndicated Revolvers to Firms without Senior Debt Rating 
 
  Base Value Change to  
New 
Probability  
change in 
Probability 
     
Deal amount (millions) 125 250 43.2% 8.9% 
Ticker symbol N Y 29.6% -4.7% 
Sales size (millions) 2500 5000 31.2% -3.1% 
Year 1996 1999 44.1% 9.8% 
Maturity (years) 1<x<=5 >5 45.7% 11.4% 
     
Probability of being a tranche 
of multi-tranche loan at base 
value 34.58%       
 
49
Table 2.19: Regression Results for AIS Based on Predicted Tranching for Syndicated Revolving Loans to Firms 
without Senior Debt Rating 
Variable Label Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept       434.19          24.37         17.81 <.0001 
pt 1 if probability of tranching > .39; Else 0       -24.09           3.60          -6.68 <.0001 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year       -13.82           1.14       -12.11 <.0001 
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise       101.90            3.77         27.06 <.0001 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0       -25.55           3.23          -7.92 <.0001 
Y89 1 If year <1990; 0 otherwise           2.37            6.61           0.36 0.7203 
Y90 1 if year = 1990; 0 otherwise       -16.23           9.17          -1.77 0.0768 
y91 1 if year = 1991; 0 otherwise         25.39            9.70           2.62 0.0089 
y92 1 if year = 1992; 0 otherwise          -8.72           8.29          -1.05 0.2929 
y93 1 if year = 1993; 0 otherwise       -21.47           7.45          -2.88 0.004 
y94 1 if year = 1994; 0 otherwise       -31.85           6.88          -4.63 <.0001 
y95 1 if year = 1995; 0 otherwise       -42.86           6.71          -6.39 <.0001 
y96 1 if year = 1996; 0 otherwise       -40.86           6.13          -6.67 <.0001 
y97 1 if year = 1997; 0 otherwise       -62.46           6.01       -10.40 <.0001 
y98 1 if year = 1998; 0 otherwise       -44.34           6.36          -6.97 <.0001 
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year         46.96            5.64           8.33 <.0001 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs           2.55            3.92           0.65 0.5146 
N=3831                                R-squared = .2983                                 F-value = 102.74 
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Table 2.20: Regressions for AIS Based on Predicted Tranching for Syndicated Loans 
 
  Rated  Unrated  
Variable Label I     II    III   
Intercept Intercept       235.82  *         231.13  *        451.35 * 
pt 1 if probability of tranching > .50; Else 0             -5.97  *        -12.66 * 
l_sales Natural log of borrower's sales in prior year          -6.35  *            -6.18  *        -13.01 * 
Secure 1 if loan tranche is secured; 0 otherwise         66.55  *           67.76  *        104.73 * 
revolve 1 if loan tranche is a revolver; 0 otherwise       -40.43  *         -38.79  *        -53.02 * 
Tick_Y_N 1 if borrower has ticker; otherwise 0          -0.79              -1.31           -19.86 * 
r1 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =C       271.75  *         275.24  *    
r2 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CC       176.50  *         177.74  *    
r3 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =CCC       249.24  *         179.46  *    
r4 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =B       151.82  *         140.26  *    
r5 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BB         99.23  *           93.59  *    
r6 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =BBB         45.22             44.02       
r7 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =A         11.12             22.04       
r8 1 if borrower's senior debt rating =AA           8.94               9.26       
tr3 1 if r3=1 and probability of tranching > .50       -90.66  *        
tr4 1 if r4=1 and probability of tranching > .50       -16.79  *        
tr5 1 if r5=1 and probability of tranching > .50          -9.66  *        
tr6 1 if r6=1 and probability of tranching > .50           1.14          
tr7 1 if r7=1 and probability of tranching > .50         23.97  *        
tr8 1 if r8=1 and probability of tranching > .50           3.18          
m_s 1 if maturity less than or equal to 1 year -2.07376             1.77           50.47 * 
m_i 1 if maturity > 1 yr and maturity <=5yrs -6.76011 *            -4.55              6.12 * 
          
N          4,282           4,282           5,431  
R-squared  0.6241   0.6195   0.299  
F Value   237.94 *   279.75 *  137.22 * 
   All regressions include year fixed effects.  
   * Significant at 5% level 
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Figure 2.1 
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Figure 2.2 
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CHAPTER 3 
Are Bank Loans Special?  
Evidence from bank loan announcements 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Announcements regarding equity issuance have been shown to elicit negative stock returns, on 
average, and those regarding debt issuance elicit zero or slightly negative stock returns. 
However, bank loan announcements generally have positive announcement effects (Mikkelson 
and Partch, 1986; James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989). This has led researchers to 
conclude that the bank loans are somehow special. The literature tends to treat banks as quasi-
insiders. The positive bank loan announcement effect is normally justified as the market’s 
response to lowered information asymmetry regarding the borrowing firm. The literature views 
the act of making a loan by the bank as a certification of the quality of the borrowing firm. 
Recent studies have questioned this justification of the positive announcement effect (Preece and 
Mullineaux, 1994; Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel, 1995, 2006; 
Thomas and Wang, 2004). Yet the information asymmetry hypothesis is the most widely 
accepted explanation for the well-documented positive loan announcement effect.  
 
In this chapter, we show that the positive loan announcement effect was a temporal phenomenon 
that no longer exists. Also, we show that prior studies suffered from a selection bias problem. 
Loans that are announced are systematically different from those that are not announced. Firms 
with lower credit ratings and firms with low or negative operating earnings but high interest 
costs are more likely to announce their loans than other firms. All studies on loan announcement 
effects were performed on loans made in or before 1995 (pre-95), so we compare the 
announcement returns of loans made in or before 1995 with those made after 1995 (post-95). We 
find that pre-95 there was a positive announcement effect, but post-95 announcing firms, on 
average, experienced zero or negative announcement returns.  
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We also find that loan announcements are not random events. We document that firms that take 
large loans relative to their asset base are more likely to announce their loans, for example. We 
also find that firms that have little analyst following are more likely to announce their loans than 
firms followed by many analysts. Firms that have higher analyst coverage attract more media 
space than other firms, so loan announcements by firms with low analyst coverage may reflect an 
attempt by such firms to make their presence known. Additionally, we find that firms with high 
predicted EPS growth over the next three-to-five years are more likely to announce loans than 
other firms.  
 
Prior studies interpreted positive stock returns on loan announcements as an evidence for the 
information asymmetry hypothesis. They argued that the positive bank loan announcement effect 
was the market’s response to the mitigation of information asymmetry, reflecting the 
certification role of the lending banks as quasi-insiders. For a couple of reasons, we argue that 
the positive loan announcement effect observed in the prior studies cannot be construed 
convincingly as evidence in support of the certification effect. First, our study shows that strong 
selection bias exists in prior studies. Second, the announcement effect no longer exists.  
 
Prior studies on loan announcement effects generated a database of bank loan announcements 
made in the study period and studied the market’s response to the announcements. They 
performed keyword searches in news databases such as WSJ and DJ Newswire, searching for 
keywords such as “credit” and “loan.” Unfortunately, this methodology captured only loans that 
were explicitly announced in the media during the study period. Some of these studies 
acknowledged that their methodology was exposed to “loan reporting bias.” Both lenders and 
borrowers are more likely to announce positive rather than negative information, so these studies 
were likely to be biased toward higher quality loans. Firms that were able to procure loans at 
favorable rates were also more likely to announce their loans than firms that had their loans 
renewed at unfavorable terms or were allowed to expire. To avoid this selection bias problem, 
we use a different methodology in this paper. Rather than beginning with the loan 
announcements, we start with the loans themselves and then search for the announcement of 
randomly selected loans. We find that less than a quarter of all the loans made in the period are 
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announced by the company.37 We argue that if there was a well-known  positive announcement 
effect of bank loans, every firm would have an incentive to announce its bank loans. Yet over 
three quarters of borrowing firms choose not to announce their loans even though the cost of 
issuing a press release is marginal. We show that the loans that are announced are systematically 
different from those that are unannounced.  
 
Second, prior studies that found positive loan announcement effects used data from the pre-95 
period. After these studies were published, several later studies showed that the positive loan 
announcement effect was not universal across different sized firms. The positive effect was 
limited to small firms; even within small firms, only those that announced renewals of loans on 
favorable terms experienced positive loan announcement returns (Lummer and McConnell, 
1989; Slovin et al., 1992). These findings were again construed as evidence of the information 
asymmetry hypothesis because small firms face higher information asymmetry than large firms. 
Consequently, small firms benefit more from the certification of quality by the lending banks. 
However, we show that the positive loan announcement effect no longer exists even for small 
firms.  
 
This chapter makes the following contributions to the existing literature. It documents that less 
than 25% of bank loans are announced by borrowing companies. When loans are announced, the 
information flows within five trading days of the loan start date, generally the day after the loan 
closes. We introduce a new methodology to account for selection bias in event studies and show 
that prior studies suffered from selection bias. Firms that announce loans are systematically 
different from those firms that do not. We show that firms with low debt ratings, high interest 
expense but low operating income, little analyst following, and high forecasted EPS growth rate, 
and firms that take relatively large loans in comparison with their asset base are more likely to 
announce their loans. We also show that the positive loan announcement effect observed in prior 
studies is limited to their sample period. No positive loan announcement effect exists over the 
last ten years. On the contrary, loan announcements elicit insignificantly negative returns.  
 
                                                 
37 We consider a loan to have been announced if any news story in any of the newswires covered by Factiva 
database explicitly mentions the loan in question. Our study period is 1987 to 2004. 
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Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel, 2006 (hereafter, “BFG”) have documented underperformance of 
bank borrowers in three years following the event, and we find similar underperformance in our 
study. Based on prior studies of loan announcements, BFG (2006) state that the 
underperformance of bank borrowers after positive announcement returns indicates reversal, 
which means that the market is not only initially wrong about the magnitude of the loan’s effect 
on firm value, but it is also wrong about the direction. But in our study we show that post-95 
loan announcements elicit negative announcement returns, thereby rightly predicting the future 
negative abnormal stock returns of the borrowing firms. Furthermore, borrowers of the loans 
announced by the company pre-95 actually had significantly higher EPS growth rates over five 
years after the event than did non-announcing borrowers.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We review the existing literature in section II of 
the paper. In section III we discuss our methodology and data. Section IV discusses our results 
and we test the robustness of our results in section V. We offer some possible explanations for 
our observations and discuss avenues for future research in section VI. We conclude in section 
VII and elaborate on our calculation of the test statistics in the Appendix section of the chapter. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that issuance of equity by a firm signals that managers of the 
firm consider it to be overvalued. Hence, announcement of a seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
results in an average negative return of 2 to 3% (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and 
Korwar, 1986). Announcements of public bond issues have been shown to generate zero or 
slightly negative returns by Eckbo (1986), and Howton, Howton, and Perfect (1998). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that announcements of debt by firms with free cash flow should result in 
positive returns because the additional monitoring of the managers by the new lenders mitigates 
agency problems between the managers and the shareholders. Unlike public debt, loans from 
commercial banks have been shown to generate positive abnormal returns (Mikkelson and 
Partch, 1986; James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989).  
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The positive abnormal returns on announcement of bank loans have been rationalized using 
asymmetric information arguments and the monitoring benefits offered by a bank. Prior studies 
argue that banks capture “soft” and private information in their day-to-day dealings with 
borrowers (BFG, 1995).38 Commercial banks possess the unique power to provide corporate 
demand deposit services, for instance. They capture valuable information from the deposit 
accounts of the borrower and have better estimates of the firm’s true risk. They also have 
enhanced ability to monitor the borrower (Kane and Malkiel, 1965; Black, 1975; Fama, 1985). 
Puri (1996) analyzed pricing of bank-underwritten securities and investment-house-underwritten 
securities in the pre-Glass-Steagall period and found that investors were willing to pay a higher 
price for securities underwritten by banks rather than investment houses. These results support a 
certification role of commercial banks.  
 
However, some evidence suggests that commercial banks may not have superior private 
information regarding their borrowers. Peterson and Rajan (2002) state that even if lenders do 
not have the rich soft information obtained by commercial banks from infrequent, but close, 
contact with the borrower, more timely hard information about creditworthiness of public firms 
is readily available to all lenders. BFG (2006) find that earnings announcement returns for 
borrowing firms are significantly more volatile post-loan than pre-loan. Also, the standard 
deviation of the price reaction to earnings announcements by borrowing firms is always higher 
than that of their peer firms. They interpret this finding as a reduction in earnings transparency 
and conclude that bank loans do not mitigate asymmetric information problems of the borrower. 
They report that bank borrowers have significantly lower operating performance as compared 
with their peers in the year before announcing their loans, and this continues for three years after 
the announcement. Preece and Mullineaux (1994), and BFG (1995) investigate whether the 
lender’s identity influences the market’s reaction to a loan announcement and find that no 
significant difference exists between the market’s response to bank and non-bank loans.39 
                                                 
 
38 Peterson and Rajan (2002) define soft information as information that is hard to communicate to others, let alone 
capture in written documents. 
  
39 Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) consider both commercial banks and investment banks to be banks. 
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Thomas and Wang (2004) find that the special role of banks as corporate quasi-insiders has been 
eroding and that bond market liquidity factors affect bank loan pricing. 
 
The literature on bank loan announcement effects started with Mikkelson and Partch (1986). 
They performed a longitudinal study of 360 firms and analyzed the stock returns on these firms 
around announcement of various types of securities offering. They discovered positive stock 
returns around announcements of bank loans. Their results were then confirmed in a separate 
study by James (1987). James searched the Wall Street Journal Index for loan announcements by 
300 firms over a period of ten years from 1974 to 1983. He found a positive announcement effect 
for bank loans and a negative announcement effect for issuance of straight debt to repay bank 
loans. Lummer and McConnell (1989) added a new dimension to the bank loan announcement 
effect literature, showing that there was positive loan announcement effect for loan renewals but 
not for loan initiations.  
 
Bank loan announcement studies began producing inconsistent results after Lummer and 
McConnell (1989). Slovin et al. (1992) found no significant difference between the loan 
announcement returns of loan initiations and loan renewals. Aintablian and Roberts (2000) found 
positive returns for loan renewals and loan initiations for Canadian firms that are small or have 
low credit ratings. Slovin et al. (1992) found significantly positive loan announcement returns for 
small capitalization stocks, but not for large firms. Preece and Mullineaux (1994) found positive 
announcement effect even for non-bank loans.  
 
Theoretical work in the field distinguishes private debt from arms-length borrowing and justifies 
the positive announcement effect of bank loans by viewing institutional lenders as insiders who 
monitor firm performance and reduce information asymmetry (Fama, 1985; Berlin and Loeys, 
1988; Kwan and Carleton, 1998). Though syndicated loans do not necessarily fall into either of 
the two categories—private debt or arms-length borrowing—positive announcement effects have 
been documented for syndicated loans as well. Preece and Mullineaux (1996) examine the 
relation between the number of lenders and market reaction to announcements of syndicated 
loans.40 They find that only the smallest syndicated group generates a positive and significant 
                                                 
40 We include all loans in our study, including syndicated loans. 
 
 59
return. They document an inverse relationship between the number of syndicate members and the 
price reaction. Aintablian and Roberts (2000) find that syndicated loans in Canada also result in 
lower excess returns than non-syndicated loans. They interpret their results as the market’s 
positive reaction to higher contractual flexibility and fewer free-rider issues when comparing 
single-bank loans with syndicated loans. Gasbarro, Le, Schwebach, and Zumwalt (2004) find 
that announcements of syndicated loans elicit positive returns, but only for revolving credit 
agreements and not for term loans. The latter elicit significantly negative returns on 
announcement. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) find a positive 
market response to revolving credit agreements, but no significant response to term loans.  
 
Several articles have shown that the market’s reaction to a loan announcement varies with 
borrower characteristics. Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) find that larger borrowers receive 
smaller announcement returns.41 Best and Zhang (1993) find that firms with negative recent 
earnings trends or greater dispersion in expected earnings receive larger bank loan announcement 
returns. Wansley, Elayan, and Collins (1992) argue that credit announcement effect would be 
higher for firms that are more difficult to analyze. They find that firms with higher market-to-
book ratios (i.e, more growth options) are associated with slightly larger equity returns.  
 
III.  Methodology 
 
Loan announcement studies have employed relatively similar methodologies. We list the main 
papers in this literature in Table 3.1 and highlight the methodologies and sample sizes in these 
papers. All the studies perform a keyword search in one or more news databases for bank loan 
announcements. The downside to this methodology is that only those loans that are explicitly 
announced in the media are included in their samples. This introduces a loan reporting bias 
because borrowers and lenders are more likely to announce positive rather than negative 
information. Some of these studies have explicitly acknowledged this bias (Mosebach, 1999; 
Fery et al., 2003).  
 
                                                 
 
41 This is consistent with Fama (1995) who suggests that larger firms operate under the scrutiny of numerous 
external monitors.  
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Only Fery et al. (2003) make an effort to address this bias. They state that prior studies are likely 
to have samples biased toward higher quality loans. To address this problem, they include 
unannounced loans in their sample. They distinguish between published and unpublished loans 
in Australia and find that the market reacts positively to published loans while unpublished loans 
fail to elicit any positive returns. As Table 3.1 shows, all the prior studies employ relatively 
small samples (between 100 and 750 observations) even though the total number of loans made 
in their sample period was at least ten times as large.42 For example, Aintablian and Roberts 
(2000) have 137 observations in their sample, compared with 7,500 loans that we have in the 
Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) database for the same period.  
 
III. a. Data Collection 
 
Our main source of information on the population of syndicated and non-syndicated loans made 
to borrowers in the United States is the Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan database. 
The database contains both price and non-price terms of loans at origination. It also contains 
borrower-specific information such as the firm’s senior debt rating and sales at the time of 
origination of the loan. The data in Dealscan primarily comes from SEC filings, large loan 
syndicators, and a staff of reporters. LPC claims that its database contains most of the loans 
made to large, publicly traded companies. It is one of the leading sources of data for research on 
loans worldwide. We use confirmed data in our study on U.S. borrowers that are not government 
entities or utilities between 1987 and 2004 (inclusive). Since we are interested in the information 
content of bank loans as reflected in the movement of the borrower’s stock price, we delete all 
observations lacking a ticker symbol. We are left with 20,140 loan observations. This constitutes 
our full sample of loans—single-bank loans and syndicated loans—made to public borrowers in 
the United States between 1987 and 2004.  
 
To start, we randomly pick 200 loans without replacement from the total population of 20,140 
loans. We analyze the characteristics of our sample of loans and compare it with those of the 
                                                 
42 Gasbarro, Le, Schwebach, and Zumwalt (2004) provide an exception because they do not delete contaminated 
announcements and include multiple announcements for the same loan. Yet they have only 2,061 observations as 
compared with 9,669 loans present in the Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database for the same period. 
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population and find it representative.43 We thoroughly search for the announcements of these 
loans in the Factiva database.44 We do not use a computer program to search for the 
announcement. Rather we read through the text of news stories and search for each 
announcement manually to minimize measurement error. While searching for each loan 
announcement, we use possible combinations of the company name, ticker, bank names, loan 
amount, loan purpose, and any other possible keyword(s). Our search window is six months prior 
to and two months after the loan start date. No prior studies have analyzed the average timing of 
a loan announcement relative to the loan start date, so one of the contributions of our study is to 
document the average time period between the loan closing date and the loan announcement 
date. 
 
We are able to find some form of mention in the media for 57 of the 200 loan announcements in 
our sample. Of the 57 instances, five media reports talked about a borrower either seeking the 
loan or expecting to receive the loan or a lead bank inviting syndicate members to participate in a 
loan. The remaining 52 announcements confirmed that the loan was made. Of these 
announcements, 37 were made by the company and one was made by the lending bank. We 
considered a loan to have been announced by the company when the media report said “in a 
press release the company said” or “the company announced today.” We also considered an 
announcement to have been made by the company when the news story had a quote from the 
company’s top management. The source of information in ten announcements was either 
reporters or SEC filings and we could not ascertain the source of information in four 
announcements.  
 
We noted that majority of the loan announcements took place on or right after the loan closing 
date. Of the 52 announcements only one announcement took place 17 days before closing. All 
the other announcements took place within 15 days. Seven of the loan announcements were 
made on the day the loan closed, and 12 announcements were made the next trading day. Of the 
52 announcements, 34 were made within five days of the loan start date. Eleven loan 
                                                 
43 Important characteristics include loan amount, loan maturity, distribution method, number of facilities in the loan, 
lender identity, borrower rating, borrower sales size, and the year the loan was originated. 
 
44 Factiva collects its information from 10,000 authoritative sources that include exclusive combinations of the Wall 
Street Journal, Financial Times, Dow Jones and Reuters newswires, and the Associated Press. 
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announcements were made prior to the loan start date and seven were made after more than five 
days past the loan start date. We also capture the hour of the loan announcements. After 
accounting for announcements that were made after 4:00 P.M., 13 of the 52 announcements were 
effectively made the next trading day.  
 
All the announcements in our sample of 200 firms except one took place within 15 days of the 
loan start date, so we now randomly pick 600 more loans from our population of 20,140 loans 
and search for their announcements in a narrower window of +/- 15 days from the loan start date. 
Figure 3.1 shows the histogram for all the loan announcements in our sample of 800 loans 
relative to the loan start date.45 It shows that most of the loan announcements took place on the 
day after the loan start day. Over two thirds of the announcements (159 of 232) took place within 
five days after the closing date. In Figure 3.2 we show the histogram for loan announcements 
made by the company. The shape of the histogram in Figure 3.2 is similar to that of Figure 3.1 
except for one major difference. In Figure 3.1, 41 of the total of 232 announcements (17.6%) 
took place more than a day before the loan start date, while only 12 of 168 announcements 
(7.1%) made by the company took place more than a day before the loan start day. This shows 
that companies announce their loans very close to the closing date. Reporters may be more likely 
to announce loans based on rumor and before the actual closing date. 
  
We also keep track of all news stories in the media regarding the borrowing firms in our sample 
around the loan closing date and the loan announcement date. We find that 100 of the 232 loan 
announcements had contaminating news within three days of the loan announcement day. We 
consider the following news as contaminating: (1) ratings initiation, downgrade or upgrade, (2) 
buyback of shares, (3) creation of a subsidiary, (4) acquiring or losing a big order, (5) new 
exchange listing of a subsidiary or options/IPO initiations, (6) earnings/dividends 
announcements, (7) union strike or failed union renegotiations, (8) acquisition, spinoff, or tender 
offer, (9) filing of major lawsuit or settlement, (10) sale of a division, (11) growth/expansion in a 
                                                 
45 Mosebach (1999) documents that large loans are usually captured through Gold Sheets. Large banks inform the 
reporters at Loan Pricing Corporation of the large loans made during the week ending Thursday evening. 
Information on these loans is then usually distributed in the market through Gold Sheets. Hence, we are unable to 
find press releases for any major loan above $1 billion. In our conversation with an officer at Loan Pricing 
Corporation it was confirmed that Gold Sheets capture very large and mid-cap loans only (usually over $500 
million). 
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new market or introduction of a new product, (12) appointment or resignation of a board member 
or senior management, and (13) announcement of other loans or securities. We keep track of all 
the important news stories in the media around the loan start date for all firms in our sample 
irrespective of whether the borrowing company made an announcement. We consider news to be 
contaminating if a material news story was published in the media within three days of the loan 
start date.  
 
We then get return data on the borrowing firms and the market from CRSP. From the 800 loans 
we are able to find return data on the borrowing firms for 741 loans. We get the returns of the 
borrowing firms and the market on the announcement day and +/-1 trading days around the 
announcement day. When the announcement was made on a non-trading day, we consider the 
announcement to have been made on the next trading day. We also get the returns of the 
borrowing firms and the market on the loan start date and +/-1 trading days of the loan start date. 
For the purposes of calculating the t-statistics we also get the returns of the borrowing firm and 
the market for a year ending 30 days before the loan closing date. To calculate three-year 
abnormal returns we get the returns of all borrowers and the market for three years beginning 
with the loan closing date. We then get financial data on the borrowing firm from Compustat. 
We get financial data for seven years beginning with the year prior to the one in which the loan 
was made. We get the following data: (1) total assets (DATA6), (2) net sales (DATA12), (3) 
operating income before depreciation (DATA13), (4) interest expense (DATA15), (5) price—
calendar year—close (DATA24), (6) common shares outstanding (DATA25), (7) employees 
(DATA29), and (8) net income (DATA172). We are able to get borrower financial data for 735 
loans out of the 800 loans in the sample.  
 
We get analyst forecast data for our borrowing firms from I/B/E/S. We use the identification file 
of I/B/E/S to match the CUSIP number of our borrowing firms with the unique ticker used by 
I/B/E/S. We then get the following data on our borrowing firms: (1) number of analyst estimates 
for a firm in a given month, (2) standard deviation of the EPS estimates, (3) mean of the EPS 
estimates, (4) mean of the forecasted long-term EPS growth, and (5) median of the forecasted 
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long-term EPS growth. We also get data on actual five-year EPS growth for our borrowing firms. 
We are able to get analyst forecast data for 636 loans.46  
 
We calculate the number of analysts following a borrowing firm as the maximum number of 
annual EPS estimates for the borrowing firm in any month of the year in which the loan was 
made. We account only for annual EPS estimates because all analysts that make quarterly 
forecasts of EPS for a firm also make annual forecasts. To calculate the coefficient of variation 
of EPS estimates we calculate the average of the mean annual EPS estimates for the twelve 
months of the loan year and the average of the standard deviation of the annual EPS estimate for 
the twelve months of the loan year. We then calculate the coefficient of variation (CV) for each 
borrowing firm for the loan year by dividing the average of the standard deviation by the average 
of annual EPS estimate. We then use the absolute value of the CV measure as a proxy for 
dispersion of opinion among analysts regarding EPS of the firm. When a company is followed by 
only one analyst, the standard deviation of the estimate cannot be calculated. For each loan we 
find the mean of the forecasted long-term growth estimates of the borrowing firm and the median 
forecasted long-term growth estimates in the month of the loan start date. When there was no 
long term EPS growth estimate made for the borrowing firm in the month of the loan start date, 
we take the estimates from a month in the same year closest to the loan closing date. The long-
term growth estimate is a measure of the expected annual increase in operating earnings of a 
company over its next full business cycle, which is usually three to five years. The mean 
forecasted long-term growth measure for a firm is the mean of the several analysts’ estimates of 
long-term growth for the firm and it captures the average of all the predictions of analysts 
following the firm. The median forecasted long-term growth measure for a firm is the median of 
the several analysts’ estimates of long term growth for the firm, and it captures the expectation of 
an average analyst. We get the actual five-year EPS growth of the borrowing firm in the month 
of the loan start date and also in the 60th month from the loan start date. I/B/E/S reports five-year 
actual EPS growth rate as the average annualized growth in EPS for the last five years measured 
as the slope of least square curve fit to the logarithm of the reported earnings.  
 
 
                                                 
46 We could not ascertain the borrower’s CUSIP number for ten loans in our sample. 
 
 65
IV. Results 
 
Some distinguishing features of this chapter are our methodology and our database on 
announcements of bank loans. We are able to distinguish between loans that were announced in 
the media and ones that were never announced. We are also able to identify the source of 
information for the announcement, whether it was the borrowing company, the lending bank, or 
a third party. However, we first need to show that our sample of loans was representative of the 
population. In Table 3.2 we compare the descriptive statistics for the population of all loans in 
the LPC’s Dealscan database with that of our sample of loans. The average rating of a loan in the 
Dealscan database is 5.51, which represents a rating between BBB and BB.47 Similarly, the 
average rating of loans in our sample is 5.69, which also represents a rating between BBB and 
BB. Loans in the Dealscan database have an average loan size of $273 million and maturity of 
3.73 years. Loans in our sample have an average loan size of $309.6 million and maturity of 3.45 
years. Of the loans in the population, 59% were syndicated, and an average of 5.46 lenders 
participated in a loan. Similarly, in our sample 63% of the loans were syndicated and an average 
of 6.15 lenders participated. For the population, the borrowers’ average sales in the year prior to 
the loan were $2.28 billion; in our sample that number was $3.23 billion. The all-in-spread-
drawn (AIS), a measure of the interest rate charged on the loan over the base rate, usually 
LIBOR, was 199.68 basis points for the population and 182 basis points for the sample. This 
indicates that the loans in our sample were on average similar to the loans in the population. The 
high standard deviations of loan and borrower characteristics in the population of loans indicate 
that the mean of the loan and borrower characteristics of loans in our sample were not 
statistically or economically different from those of the population. 
 
IV. a. Event day returns 
 
In Table 3.3 we show that pre-95 loan announcements elicited positive announcement returns as 
documented in the prior studies. We use two measures of abnormal returns to capture the 
announcement effect of bank loans. The first measure is the holding period return (HPR) on the 
                                                 
47 Firms with the highest senior debt rating of AAA are deemed to have a value of nine for the rating variable, and 
those with the lowest rating of C are deemed to have a value of one.  
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stock for the event date. This measure of abnormal return assumes that the expected return for a 
stock on a given day is zero. The second measure of abnormal return is the market-adjusted 
return. This measure assumes that the return on the market on any given day is an unbiased 
estimate for the average return on a sample of firms. We calculate the abnormal return on our 
sample of firms as the average of the difference between the realized return on the sample of 
firms and the market on the given day. We use the value-weighted return (including 
disbursements) on CRSP stocks as a proxy for the market.  
 
As noted by Brown and Warner (1980), the standard deviation of returns is higher during the 
announcement periods. Consequently, calculating the test statistics using standard deviation of 
abnormal returns on the announcement date can lead to erroneous results. Therefore, we use the 
standard deviation of the daily abnormal return for the sample firms for the year ending 30 days 
before the announcement date. We elaborate on our methodology in Appendix A1. This method 
of calculating the test statistics assumes cross-sectional independence of the excess returns. To 
account for the possible cross-sectional dependence, we also calculate test statistics using the 
“portfolio” methodology of Brown and Warner (1985). We elaborate on this methodology in 
Appendix A2. We report the average abnormal return of the borrowing firms on the event date 
and the test statistics in Table 3.3.  
 
We find that the average abnormal return on the announcement day for our sample of borrowing 
firms was not significantly different from zero. However, the pre-95 average holding period 
return was 132 basis points on the announcement day for the sample of borrowing firms that did 
not have other contaminating news in the media within three days of the announcement. The 
average market adjusted abnormal return on the announcement day for such firms was 113 basis 
points. These results are consistent with the results of prior studies. However, post-95, the 
average holding period return and the average market adjusted abnormal return on the 
announcement day for the sample of borrowing firms are negative. The holding period return 
was minus 46 basis points and the market adjusted abnormal return was significantly negative at 
82 basis points below the market. This finding is at odds with prior studies.  
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IV. b. Syndicated loans vs. non-syndicated loans 
 
Earlier studies have distinguished between syndicated loans and non-syndicated loans and have 
found that the positive loan announcement effect is lower for syndicated loans. Perhaps our 
results are driven primarily by an increase in syndicated lending over the last ten years. 
Therefore, we perform our analysis separately for syndicated loans and non-syndicated loans. 
The results are reported in Table 3.4. We find that pre-95 syndicated loans earned lower 
announcement returns than did non-syndicated loans. In the post-95 period, the abnormal returns 
for non-syndicated loans on the event day were more negative than those of syndicated loans. 
Pre-95 the HPR and the market-adjusted return on the event date were 2.7% and 2.5% 
respectively for the non-syndicated loans and 0.3% and 0.1% for the syndicated loans. Post-95, 
the non-syndicated loans had event day HPR of -1.2% and market adjusted return of -1.5%, 
compared with HPR of 0% and market adjusted return of -0.5% for syndicated loans. Our 
analysis shows that our results are not driven by announcements of syndicated loans. 
 
IV. c. Selection bias—announcing versus non-announcing firms 
 
To show that earlier studies suffered from a selection bias, we must demonstrate that firms that 
announce loans are systematically different from those firms that do not. We therefore divide our 
sample firms based on their senior debt rating. We have borrowing rating information for 342 of 
the 800 loans in our sample. We find that none of the firms rated AA or higher announced their 
loans. Less than 20% of the firms rated BBB or higher announced their loans, but over 40% of 
the loans made to firms rated BB or lower were announced (see Table 3.5, panel A). Less than 
5% of the loans made to investment grade companies (debt rating of A or higher) were 
announced by the company itself, but over 23% of the loans made to speculative grade 
companies (debt rating of BB or lower) were announced by the company. This indicates that 
firms with low credit ratings consider that closing a bank loan is an important event and therefore 
announce their bank loans.  
 
Similarly, in panel B of Table 3.5, we show that firms that had either negative or zero operating 
earnings in the prior year were twice as likely to announce their loans compared with other firms. 
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Table 3.6 shows that only 25% of the loans made to firms with Interest-to-EBITDA ratio of less 
than 0.1 were announced, but over 40% of the loans made to firms with negative operating 
earnings were announced. Additionally, when a loan to a firm with negative operating income 
was announced, the company itself was more likely to be the source of information. Only 17% of 
the loans to firms with an interest to EBITDA ratio of less than 0.1 (but greater than equal to 
zero) were announced by the borrowing firm, but 39% of the loans to firms with negative 
EBITDA, but positive interest expense, were announced by the borrowing firm. Perhaps firms 
with little or negative earnings find it difficult to get new loans and therefore consider raising a 
bank loan an event worth announcing.  
 
Earlier studies have shown that small firms experience higher stock returns on bank loan 
announcements compared with large firms. We show in Table 3.7 that small firms are more 
likely to announce their bank loans compared with large firms. We show that 35% of the loans 
made to companies with a market capitalization of less than $100 million were announced, 
versus only 7% of the loans made to companies with market capitalization of over $10 billion. In 
addition, only 1% of the companies with capitalization over $10 billion announced their loans, 
versus 30% of the firms with capitalization less than $100 million. Similarly, we show in Table 
3.8 that 48% of the loans with loan size-to-borrower asset ratios of over 50% were announced 
compared with just 8% of the loans with loan size-to-borrower asset ratios of less than 5%. 
Loans are more likely to be announced when they form a sizeable portion of the borrower’s 
capital.  
 
In Table 3.9 we show that firms with eight or fewer analysts are more than twice as likely to 
announce their loans, compared with firms with more than eight analysts. This holds true for 
loans made pre-95 and post-95. Post-95, 33% of the loans made to firms with one to four 
analysts were announced by the company, compared with only 5% of the loans made to firms 
with 16 or more analysts. In Table 3.12 we show that the average number of analysts following a 
borrowing firm that announced its loan is significantly lower than the average number of analysts 
following a borrowing firm that did not. For our sample period, a borrowing firm that announced 
had 4.32 analysts on average, but a company that did not announce had, on average, twice as 
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many analysts following the firm. The difference in the average number of analysts following the 
announcing and the non-announcing borrowing firms was significant both pre-95 and post-95.  
 
In Table 3.10 we show that the mean forecasted long-term growth measure for borrowing firms 
that announced their bank loans is significantly higher than the same measure for firms that did 
not. At the time of the loan, the operating earnings of the announcing firms were forecasted to 
grow, on average, at a rate of 19.72% over the next three to five years, compared with 15.88% 
for non-announcing firms. Pre-95 we do not find any significant difference between the 
forecasted long-term growth measures of the announcing and the non-announcing firms, but 
post-95 the difference is more pronounced and significant. The operating earnings of the 
announcing firms were forecasted to grow at a rate of 20.19% compared with 15.58% for the 
non-announcing firms. However, we show in Table 3.13 that the EPS of an average announcing 
firm did not grow any faster over the five years prior to the loan than a non-announcing firm. 
The mean five-year EPS growth rate of an announcing firm at the time of loan was 12.58%, 
compared with 10.78% for a non-announcing firm. We do not find any statistical significance for 
the difference in the two means.  
 
In the literature, the coefficient of variation measure is used to measure dispersion of opinion 
among analysts following a firm. Table 3.11 shows that 17.7% of the firms that had a CV 
measure of less than .05 announced their loans, but 33.3% of the firms with a CV measure of 0.5 
or more announced their loans. The difference of proportions test shows that the proportion of 
firms announcing their loans is significantly different between firms that have CV of less than 
.25 and those with CV of .25 or more. Prior studies have argued that firms with high dispersion 
of analyst estimates are more likely to benefit from mitigation of information asymmetries. In 
panel B of Table 3.12, we compare the mean CV measure for announcing firms and non-
announcing firms, but we do not find any statistical significance in the difference of the means.  
 
IV. d. Probability of announcement 
 
Thus far we have analyzed several characteristics of the borrowing firms and have shown that 
some firms are more likely to announce their loans than others. In Table 3.14 we present the 
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descriptive statistics of our sample loans and in Tables 3.15 through 3.22 we analyze the impact 
of different loan and borrower characteristics on the likelihood a firm will announce its bank 
loan. Table 3.14 shows that 29% of the loans in our sample were announced and only 21% were 
announced by the company. Of the loans in our sample, 63% were syndicated loans. On average, 
bank loans were one-third the size of the total assets of the borrowing firms. Of the borrowing 
firms in our sample, the average market capitalization was $4.7 billion. The biggest firm was 
valued at $162 billion and the smallest firm at only $1.2 million. Of the borrowing firms, 36% 
had a market capitalization of over $1 billion. Of the loans in our sample, 23% were made in the 
pre-95 period. An average of 7.73 analysts followed the borrowing company, up to a maximum 
of 41. The average forecasted long-term growth of the borrowing firms was 16.55%. The highest 
forecasted three- to five-year growth rate was 75%. Of the borrowing firms in our sample, 15% 
did not have positive operating earnings.  
 
In Table 3.15 we present the results of logistic regression to predict the probability a loan will be 
announced in the media either by the borrowing firm, the lending institution, or a third party. We 
use several loan and borrower characteristics as the independent variables. Even though we have 
shown earlier that announcing firms have lower senior debt ratings than non-announcing firms, 
we do not use a rating variable in our regression because we do not have senior debt rating data 
for a significant number of observations. We contend that the independent variables capturing 
the loan size to total assets ratio, the market value of the firm, and the operating income of the 
firms reasonably capture the impact of debt rating on the likelihood of a loan announcement.48 
The results of our regressions show that the probability of a loan being announced in the media 
increases with the forecasted growth rate of the firm. A syndicated loan is more likely to be 
announced than a single-bank loan, and the probability of loan announcement is lower for firms 
with more than eight analysts. The probability of announcement increases with dispersion of 
opinion among analysts regarding the firm’s EPS. As the ratio of loan size-to-total assets 
increases, the loan is more likely to be announced. Table 3.15 provides information on the sign 
and statistical significance of each coefficient estimate, but the magnitude of impact of each 
independent variable on the probability of announcement is not obvious. In Table 3.16 we show 
                                                 
48 Our results remain qualitatively the same when we include the rating variable in the regression, but the power of 
our regression decreases reflecting a lower number of observations. 
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the change in the probability of announcement for a given change in the independent variable. 
For a non-syndicated loan for $100 million made post-95 to a firm with less than $1 billion 
market capitalization, $300 million of total assets (implying loan size-to-assets ratio of .33), 
positive operating earnings, followed by eight or fewer analysts, forecasted to grow at 10% over 
the next three to five years, and a CV measure of 0.20, the probability of loan announcement was 
22.34%. If the firm were to take a $200 million loan (implying a loan size-to-assets ratio of .67), 
the probability of announcement would increase to 34.97%. If the firm were to take a $100 
million syndicated loan rather than non-syndicated loan, the probability of announcement would 
increase to 36.97%. If our base firm were to be followed by more than eight analysts, the 
probability of announcement would decrease to 12.87%. An increase of forecasted long-term 
growth of our base firm from 10% to 20% would increase the probability of announcement from 
22.34% to 28.67%. The probability of loan announcement was 1.47% less pre-95 than in the 
post-95 period.  
 
We have shown that pre-95 there was a positive announcement return, but post-95 there is no 
positive announcement effect. Rather, the announcement returns on average have been negative 
post-95. This raises the obvious question: Why have the loan announcement returns changed? In 
Table 3.17 and Table 3.18 we show that the mix of firms that announced their loans pre-95 is 
significantly different from the group of firms that announced their loans post-95. This change in 
the nature of firms that announced loans can explain the change in the announcement returns pre-
95 and post-95. The logistic regression in Table 3.17 includes the interaction term between the 
pre-95 variable and other independent variables. The interaction terms capture the differential 
impact of each borrower and loan characteristic on the probability of loan announcement pre-95 
and post-95. In Table 3.18, we show the change in the probability of loan announcement for a 
firm as the borrower and loan characteristics changed pre- and post-95. The results of our 
regression suggest that the probability of loan announcement for our base loan was 22.90% post-
95, but the probability of announcement for the same loan was only 15.24% pre-95. Post-95, an 
increase in the forecasted growth rate of the base firm from 10% to 20% would increase the 
probability of announcement from 22.9% to 31.34%, but pre-95 such an increase in the 
forecasted growth rate would have increased the probability of announcement from 15.24% to 
just 16.12%. Additionally, post-95 an increase in the number of analysts following our base firm 
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from fewer than eight analysts to more than eight analysts would have decreased the probability 
of announcement from 22.90% to 10.80% only, but pre-95 such an increase in the analyst 
following would have increased the probability of announcement from 15.24% to 19.43%. The 
results show that post-95 small firms that took large loans had high forecasted growth rates and 
little analyst-following announced their loans. Whereas, in the pre-95 period, the firms that 
announced their loans were relatively mature and had relatively higher analyst following than 
firms announcing their loans post-95.  
 
In Tables 3.14 through 3.18 we calculate the probability of a loan announcement in the media by 
the company, the lending bank, or a third party, but in Table 3.19 through 3.22 we calculate the 
probability the borrowing firm will announce its loan. Our results in Table 3.19 suggest that a 
company was more likely to announce its loan post-95 than pre-95. As in prior regressions, the 
results show that post-95 growth-hungry small firms with little analyst-following announced 
their loans; whereas, mature companies with better analyst-following and relatively larger assets 
bases announced their loans pre-95. The higher risk associated with small, relatively unknown, 
growth firms makes the mix of firms announcing their loans post-95 significantly different from 
the mix of firms announcing their loans pre-95. This difference in the risk level of the 
announcing firms may explain the difference in the announcement effect of bank loans pre-95 
and post-95.  
 
IV. e. Long-run abnormal returns 
 
Thus far we have established that firms that announce their loans have significantly different 
characteristics from those that do not. Announcing firms experienced a positive loan 
announcement effect pre-95 but zero or negative announcement returns post-95. We have also 
established that the firms announcing their loans pre-95 were different from the firms 
announcing their loans post-95. Now we analyze the post-announcement operating performance 
and abnormal returns of announcing and non-announcing firms. BFG (2006) has already 
documented the long-run underperformance of bank borrowers. Our objective is to compare the 
performance of borrowing firms that announced their loans with the performance of those that 
did not. Measuring long-term abnormal performance is a very challenging task because every 
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known way of calculating normal returns has shortcomings. Recent studies have favored the 
control matched-sample approach of Barber and Lyon (1997) over the traditional approach of 
comparing the returns of the event portfolio with that of the benchmark market portfolio. Their 
approach ameliorates the problems related to skewness of the abnormal returns calculated using 
the traditional approach, and it adjusts for the biases that may arise from new listing and market 
portfolio balancing. In this chapter, we compare the abnormal returns of firms that announced 
their loans and the firms that did not. Since both sets of firms experienced the same corporate 
event—taking a bank loan—and because the abnormal returns for both sets of firms would 
experience similar problems regarding skewness, new listing, and rebalancing, the abnormal 
returns calculated using the traditional approach should be comparable across the two sets of 
firms. Additionally, the control matched-sample approach relies on matching criteria like the SIC 
classification and the size of the firm, which do not always result in true match for the firms in 
question. Also, if we were to use the control matched-sample approach, we would lose valuable 
observations from our sample because we do not have data on SIC classifications and size for the 
borrowing firms for 71 loans in our sample.49 Hence we use the traditional approach to calculate 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), but test the 
robustness of our results by comparing the abnormal returns of our borrowing firms over beta-
matched and standard deviation-matched portfolios.  
 
In Table 3.24 we present the BHAR for the borrowing firms of our sample loans. We calculate 
BHAR as follows: 
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where t is the number of calendar days since the loan start date and i is the borrowing firm. We 
use the value-weighted market return as the market HPR in our calculation of abnormal returns. 
We need return data for three years after the loan start date to calculate three-year BHAR, so we 
lose a significant number of observations either because the borrowing firm took a loan toward 
the end of our sample period or because the firm was delisted or acquired within three years of 
the loan closing. We are able to calculate BHAR for firms taking 506 loans in our sample. Given 
                                                 
49 BFG (2006) have 7,882 loans in their sample when they match loans based on two-digit SIC as compared with 
9,730 loans when they match based on size alone. This represents a loss of almost 19% of the observations.  
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the skewness of BHAR, the average BHAR is a biased indicator of the average performance of a 
borrowing firm, but the median BHAR is not. Hence, we compare the median BHAR of 
announcing and non-announcing firms in Table 3.25. The median BHAR over the value-
weighted market for our sample of borrowing firms was -9% for the firms that did not announce 
their loans and -4% for firms that did. This implies that the stock of an average borrowing firm 
that did not announce its loan performed 9% lower than the value-weighted market over a period 
of three years from the loan closing date, while the stock of an average borrowing firm that 
announced its loan underperformed the market by 4%. BFG (2006) have already documented the 
underperformance of borrowing firms. They found a median three-year BHAR of -9.70% for 
borrowing firms using a control matched-sample approach based on SIC codes and size. Despite 
our use of the traditional approach, our results for median BHAR are comparable with those of 
BFG (2006). When we use the equal-weighted returns to calculate BHAR instead of the value-
weighted return the underperformance of borrowing firms is more pronounced. However, our 
objective in this chapter is to compare the performance of borrowing firms that announced their 
loans with the abnormal returns of the firms that did not. We therefore perform the median test 
on the two sets of borrowing firms. We do not find evidence of a significant difference in the 
median BHAR for the announcing and the non-announcing firms.  
 
However, the distribution of BHAR in Table 3.24 suggests that announcing firms form a large 
proportion of the firms that either perform very well or very poorly relative to the market. More 
than 26% of the firms that had BHAR of 100% above the market or 100% below the market 
announced their loans. On the other hand, only 14% of the firms that had BHAR between -100% 
and +100% announced their loans. This suggests that announcing firms are more likely to 
severely underperform or overperform the market and therefore are riskier than the average firm 
in the market. Pre-95 over 26% of the borrowing firms that had a three-year BHAR of less than -
100% or greater than +100% announced their loans, compared with less than 8% of the firms 
with a BHAR between -100% and +100%. We observe similar results for the post-95 period 
also. We calculate BHAR over the equal-weighted market also and find similar results. To test 
the hypothesis that announcing firms either performed extremely well or extremely poorly 
relative to the value-weighted market index, we calculate the absolute value of the BHAR over 
the value-weighted market and compare the mean absolute BHAR for announcing and the non-
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announcing firms. The mean of the absolute BHAR for announcing firms is significantly higher 
than the mean of the absolute BHAR for non-announcing firms. We also perform the median test 
to compare the median of the absolute BHARs for announcing and non-announcing firms. We 
find that the median absolute BHAR for announcing firms is significantly higher than the median 
absolute BHAR for non-announcing firms. We find similar results pre-95 and post-95.  
 
IV. f. Post-announcement operating efficiency 
 
We have documented that there was no significant difference between the BHARs for 
announcing and non-announcing firms. However, in the three years after the loan, announcing 
firms either performed very well or very poorly relative to the non-announcing firms, on average. 
We now compare the relative operating performance of the announcing and non-announcing 
firms. The prior literature on relationship lending suggests that firms that borrow from banks get 
monitoring benefits. Perhaps firms that expect higher monitoring benefits are more likely to 
announce their bank loans. Since monitoring benefits should result in higher operating 
efficiency, we compare some of the measures of such efficiency for announcing and non-
announcing firms. Our first measure of operating efficiency captures the operating earnings 
generated by the firm per dollar of assets, the ratio of EBITDA (DATA13) to total assets 
(DATA6). Our second measure captures the net profit margin of the borrowing firm, the ratio of 
net income (DATA172) to net sales (DATA12). Our third measure is the firm’s net income per 
dollar of assets, which is calculated as net income divided by total assets. We also measure 
employee productivity by calculating the ratio of operating earnings to number of employees. 
We also calculate the ratio of total assets to total employees (DATA29). We next calculate the 
annual growth rate of each measure of operating efficiency for each sample firm over the six 
years including the year in which the loan was taken. In Table 3.29, we show the median growth 
rate of the several measures of operating efficiency for each year, starting with the year the loan 
was closed. We do not find any significant difference in the improvement of operating efficiency 
of an average borrowing firm that announced its loan relative to one that did not. In the year after 
the loan, an employee at an average borrowing firm that announced its loan produced 6% more 
operating earnings than the previous year. However, an employee at an average non-announcing 
borrowing firm produced 2% more operating earnings in the year after the loan compared to the 
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prior year. This difference in the median growth rate of operating earnings per employee was 
statistically significant. We found no other statistically significant differences between the 
growth rate of operating measures between announcing and non-announcing firms. In Table 
3.30, we compare the cumulative growth in operating measures of operating efficiency over a 
period of time after the bank loan was taken. We find no statistically significant differences in 
the median growth rates of operating measures between announcing and non-announcing firms.  
 
We showed earlier that firms that announce their loans have higher forecasted growth rates of 
EPS than non-announcing firms. In Table 3.31, we compare the realized annualized five-year 
EPS growth rate of announcing and non-announcing firms. The average growth rate of firms that 
announced their loans was 13.28% compared with 10.95% for non-announcing firms. This 
difference in the mean growth rates of the announcing and the non-announcing firms is not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. However, pre-95, the median five-year annualized EPS 
growth rate for announcing firms was significantly higher than that of non-announcing firms. 
The EPS of an average announcing firm in the pre-95 period grew at the rate of 11.95% per year 
over the next five years, but the EPS of an average non-announcing firm grew at the rate of 
5.36% per year only. This may explain the positive announcement returns experienced by an 
average firm pre-95. Post-95 we do not find any significant difference in the realized growth 
rates of average announcing and non-announcing firms. 
  
V. Robustness check 
 
Prior studies have used an event window rather than an event date to measure the abnormal 
returns for the firms announcing their bank loans. Therefore, as a robustness test and for the sake 
of comparability we also calculate the abnormal returns for our sample firms over an event 
window. We calculate abnormal returns for our sample firms over the following three different 
event windows: (-1,0) days, (0,1) days, and (-1,1) days around the announcement date. Our 
results remain unchanged using these different event windows. In Table 3.4, we report the three-
day event window abnormal returns for our sample firms. For brevity, we do not report the 
results for the two-day event windows. 
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Measurement of abnormal returns requires that we calculate the difference between the realized 
return and the expected return. While realized returns can be measured precisely, expected 
returns cannot. In our measures of abnormal return we assumed a zero-expected return on a stock 
when we used the holding period return as a measure of abnormal return, and we assumed the 
expected return was identical to the market return when we used market-adjusted return as a 
measure of abnormal return. These assumptions are subject to argument. Therefore, as a 
robustness test, we use the “beta excess return” and the “standard deviation excess return” from 
the CRSP Eventus database as two additional measures of abnormal return. A firm’s beta excess 
return is the difference between the daily holding period return on the stock and the daily holding 
period return on a portfolio of stocks with the same beta measure as the stock in question. This 
measure adjusts for the systematic risk of the stock. The standard deviation excess return is the 
difference between the daily return on the stock and the daily return on a portfolio of stocks with 
similar return standard deviations. This measure adjusts for the return volatility of the stock. We 
report these measures of abnormal returns for the sample of borrowing firms in Table 3.3 along 
with our other measures of abnormal return. The magnitude of average beta excess returns and 
average standard deviation excess returns for our sample firms is not significantly different from 
that of their average holding period returns and average market adjusted returns. This suggests 
that our measure of abnormal returns is robust to alternative specifications. 
 
We next segregate our sample period into two sub-periods in Table 3.3 and show that the 
positive loan announcement effect was a temporal phenomenon. We use the year 1995 as our 
cutoff year. We contend that the positive loan announcement effect disappeared over time 
because of a change in the mix of firms announcing their loans, so our results should not be 
highly sensitive to the choice of the cutoff year. We therefore perform our analysis using 
different years such as 1993 and 1994 as the cutoff year and our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged (results unreported). Similarly, earlier studies have found that small firms experience 
positive loan announcement effects but large firms do not. Perhaps our results for the last ten 
years are driven by large firms that elicit no positive announcement effects. Therefore, we 
perform our analysis only on small firms, finding that small firms did not experience positive 
announcement returns in the last ten years.  
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To attribute the stock returns on a particular day or over a particular window to a particular event 
it is important to ensure that no other important events occurred close to the event being studied. 
Therefore, in event studies, observations where other contaminating events take place close to 
the event in question typically are deleted from the sample. This decreases the number of 
observations in the study and reduces the power of the tests. A researcher balances the cost of 
deleting observations against the benefits of having a clean sample. We deleted all observations 
that had any contaminating news published within three days of the loan announcement. We now 
test the sensitivity of our results to this event window of +/-3 days and deem a news story 
contaminating only when published within (-3,+1) days of the loan announcement. This new 
scheme of categorization does not significantly alter our results. Our results again remain 
unchanged when we use a (-2, +1) days window.  
 
Mosebach (1999) states that firms that take large lines of credit (over $1 billion) do not announce 
their loans because the information becomes readily available to the market via Gold Sheets.50 It 
is possible that over time, because of improvements in communication technologies, the speed of 
information diffusion has increased to an extent that firms no longer consider it important to 
announce their loans. Perhaps the market becomes aware of the new loan from loan reporters or 
publications like Gold Sheets as soon as the loan is closed. We therefore use the loan closing date 
as the event date and calculate the abnormal returns for all firms in our sample that did not 
announce their loans. If bank lending mitigates information asymmetry and if the hypothesis 
regarding the increased speed of information diffusion are true, then we should observe positive 
returns on the event dates for the sample firms that did not have any other contaminating event 
within three days of the loan start date. However, we find no such positive returns.  
 
In Table 3.10 we report that the average of the mean forecasted long-term growth estimates for 
the borrowing firms that announced their loans was higher than those of non-announcing firms. 
As mentioned earlier, the mean forecasted long-term growth measure for a firm is the mean of 
the long-term growth estimates made by several analysts following the firm. When a borrowing 
firm is followed by only a few analysts, the mean can be highly sensitive to the growth forecasts 
                                                 
50 Gold Sheets, a publication of Loan Pricing Corporation, provides information about new loan origination and loan 
terms. It is widely used by practitioners. 
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of one or two highly pessimistic or optimistic analysts. Since announcing firms, on average, have 
fewer analysts following the firm, our results in Table 3.10 panel A might be driven by a positive 
bias in the mean forecasted long-term growth measure. Hence, in panel B of Table 3.10, we 
compare the average of the median forecasted long-term growth of announcing and non-
announcing firms. The median long-term growth forecast is less susceptible to extreme optimism 
or pessimism. We find, however, that our results from panel A of Table 3.10 remain virtually 
unchanged when we use the median rather than the mean long-term growth forecasts. We also 
compare the median of the median long-term growth forecasts of announcing and non-
announcing firms. Panel B of Table 3.10 shows that an average analyst following an average 
announcing firm expected the firm’s operating earnings to grow by 17.25% per year over the 
next three to five years compared with 14.50% for an average non-announcing firm. This 
difference in growth rates is both statistically and economically significant. Our analysis in panel 
B of Table 3.10 shows that our results are not driven either by extreme optimism of a few 
analysts or abnormal growth prospects of a few outlying firms.  
 
In Tables 3.24 and 3.25, we show that announcing firms either severely underperform or 
severely overperform the market in the three years after the loan. We use the buy-and-hold return 
to measure abnormal performance of the borrowing firms. While BHAR captures the actual 
experience of an investor (Barber and Lyon, 1997), some studies argue for the use of cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR). We therefore test the robustness of our results by comparing the three-
year CAR of announcing firms with that of the non-announcing firms. We calculate the three-
year CAR as follows: 
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where t is the number of days after the loan start date and i represents the borrowing firm. We 
use the value-weighted market index as the benchmark portfolio. Table 3.28 shows that the 
median three-year CAR for the announcing firms was -7% and that of the non-announcing firms 
was -9%. The median measure for three-year CAR for our sample of borrowing firms is close to 
the median three-year abnormal returns of -9.70% found by BFG (2006). In Table 3.26 we show 
that over 20% of the firms that had three-year CAR less than -50% or higher than 100% 
announced their loans, but less than 17% of the firms that had three-year CAR between -50% 
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and 100% announced their loans. We find similar results when we divide our sample into the 
pre- and post-95 periods. When we use the equal-weighted market index as the benchmark 
portfolio, we find that 20% of the firms that had underperformed the equal-weighted market 
index by more than 75% announced their loans, and 32% of the firms that exceeded the equal-
weighted market index by 50% or more announced their loans. In Table 3.28, we compare the 
mean of the absolute three-year CARs over value-weighted market for announcing firms with 
that of the non-announcing firms. We find that the mean absolute CAR for announcing firms is 
significantly higher than that of the non-announcing firms. We also perform the median test to 
compare the absolute three-year CAR for an average announcing firm with that of an average 
non-announcing firm. We find that the median absolute CAR for announcing firms is 
significantly higher than that of the non-announcing firms. This confirms that announcing firms 
either perform extremely well or extremely poorly as compared with the market, and that our 
results on long-term performance of borrowing firms are robust to alternative specifications.  
 
As an additional test for robustness of the three-year abnormal returns for our sample of 
borrowing firms, we calculate three-year CARs over beta matched portfolios and three-year 
CARs over standard deviation matched portfolios. As mentioned earlier, CRSP provides daily 
data for beta excess return and standard deviation excess return. We calculate the three-year 
CARs as follows: 
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where β,iCAR is the three-year CAR over beta matched portfolio and adjtiHPR −β,, is beta excess 
return of the borrowing firm i on day t after the loan start date. Similarly, σ,iCAR is the three-year 
CAR over standard deviation matched portfolio and adjtiHPR −σ,, is the standard deviation excess 
return of the borrowing firm i on day t after the loan start date. In Table 3.27 we show that over 
17% of the firms that underperformed their sigma-matched peers by 50% or more, or beat their 
peers by more than 100%, announced their loans. However, less than 13% of the firms that had 
three-year σCAR  between -50% and 100% announced their loans. We find similar results when 
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we divide the sample into two sets of firms based on loans made pre-95 and post-95. When we 
use CARs over beta matched portfolios, we again find that announcing firms were more likely to 
perform extremely well or extremely poorly compared with their beta matched peers. In Table 
3.28, we compare the mean three-year βCAR for announcing firms with that of the non-
announcing firms. We do not find any evidence that announcing firms fared better than the non-
announcing firms in the three years after the loan closing. We do not find any significant 
difference in the median βCAR  of announcing firms and that of non-announcing firms either. 
Similarly, we do not find any significant underperformance by non-announcing firms when we 
use standard deviation matched portfolios.  
 
VI. Discussion  
 
We have documented in this chapter that about 25% of the firms that take bank loans announce 
their loans. This raises the obvious question: Why do some firms announce loans and others not? 
Theoretically, a firm will announce a loan for one of two reasons. Either the closing of the bank 
loan is an important event and the firm is required by SEC’s Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(commonly referred to as Reg FD) to disclose such material event, or the firm expects some net 
benefits from announcing the loan. After the publication of studies on positive loan 
announcement effects some companies may have announced their loans expecting to bring about 
a positive market response. Other firms might have announced for subtler reasons. For example, 
we have shown that small firms with little analyst following are more likely to announce their 
loans than firms that are followed by many analysts. Firms with little or no analyst following 
attract relatively little media attention, but the announcement of a bank loan offers the small firm 
free publicity and an opportunity to garner investor support and build consensus on future growth 
prospects. For a small firm that successfully raises a large loan, the loan announcement gives the 
firm an opportunity to re-emphasize its growth prospects to potential and existing customers, 
business partners, creditors, and employees—presumably increasing the firm’s chance of 
survival and growth.  
 
We have shown in this chapter that loan announcements engendered positive effects pre-95, but 
post-95 announcements did not have the same effect. There are several explanations for this 
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change of effect. First, banks may have lost their specialness over time. Over the last decade, 
banks have been forced to adjust their lending practices to compete with the bond and 
commercial paper markets. Second, after studies were published showing the positive loan 
announcement effect, more firms started announcing their loans. As a result loan announcements 
may have lost importance, and the associated announcement effect disappeared. We have also 
shown that the mix of firms announcing their loans pre-95 was significantly different from the 
group of firms announcing their loans post-95. The information content and the importance of 
loan announcements could be different for different types of firms. Third, the positive 
announcement effect observed pre-95 could have been falsely attributed to a certification effect 
in the prior studies. The positive loan announcement effect pre-95 could simply have been a 
result of the market’s response to new and valuable information embedded in the loan 
announcements. When a firm announces a loan, the announcement provides the market with 
information regarding the availability of funds, growth prospects, and riskiness of the firm. Over 
time the information content of loan announcements could have changed.  
 
In Table 3.23 we show that most of the positive announcement effect pre-95 reflected firms that 
had high interest expense in the prior year but relatively little or no operating income. These 
firms already had bank debt and presumably had received any certification impact from their 
existing lenders. Yet they experienced high announcement returns. Perhaps the high 
announcement returns were because the loan announcements provided new information to the 
market regarding availability of funds to relatively distressed firms. We have documented that 
low-rated firms announce their loans. Perhaps the announcement of loans by such firms provides 
little or no indication regarding certification of quality by the lending bank but rather information 
regarding availability of funds to a relatively less creditworthy firm. When a firm makes a loan 
announcement, the market adjusts its expectations regarding the magnitude, timing, and riskiness 
of the borrowing firm’s future cash flows, and this adjustment of expectations underpins the 
announcement effect. Since new information in the loan announcement could result in either 
upward or downward revision of expectations, the announcement effect could be positive or 
negative. We suggest that it is difficult to ascertain whether the market’s response to a loan 
announcement is because of lower information asymmetry regarding the borrowing firm, 
reflecting certification of quality by the lending bank as quasi-insider, or simply an adjustment of 
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investor expectations in light of “latent” information embedded in the loan announcement. 
Perhaps studying the market’s response to loan announcements is not an appropriate method of 
capturing any bank “specialness”. This is an issue for future research. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Prior studies have shown that announcing a bank loan has a positive effect on the market value 
of the equity of the borrowing firm. However, these studies relied on data compiled by 
performing keyword searches for loan announcements in news databases such as the WSJI and 
DJ Newswire. We show that earlier studies suffered from a major selection bias problem: 
borrowing firms that announce their loans are systematically different from those that do not. 
Small firms that take large loans, have little analyst following, and have high growth prospects 
are more likely to announce their loans. Announcing firms are also likely to have low debt 
ratings, little or negative operating earnings, but high interest expense. We also show that even 
though firms that announced bank loans earned positive announcement returns in the pre-95 
period, the loan announcement effect has not been positive in the last ten years. This could be 
because the firms that announced their loans post-95 were significantly different from the firms 
that announced their loans pre-95. The post-95 announcing firms were small firms with high 
forecasted EPS growth and little analyst following, but in the pre-95 period the firms that 
announced their loans were relatively more mature and were followed by more analysts. This 
finding runs counter to the view that information asymmetries underpin any observed 
announcement effect. 
 
We also document that all firms that borrow from banks do not announce their loans. The 
existing literature argues that bank loan announcements decrease information asymmetry 
problems and the banks “certify” the value of certain firms by granting them loans. If all bank 
loans alleviated information asymmetry problems, then all firms would have an incentive to 
announce their loans. Yet less than 25% of our sample firms choose to do so. We also document 
that most companies that announce their loans do so within a week after the loan start date.  
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BFG (2006) have documented underperformance by bank borrowers in three years following the 
announcement event, and we find similar underperformance in our study. Based on prior studies 
of loan announcements, BFG (2006) state that the underperformance of bank borrowers after 
positive announcement returns indicates reversal, which means that the market is not only 
initially wrong about the magnitude of the loan’s effect on firm value, but it is also wrong about 
the direction. But in our study we show that post-95 loan announcements elicit negative 
announcement returns, thereby rightly predicting the future negative abnormal stock returns of 
borrowing firms. Also, borrowers that announced loans in the pre-95 period actually had 
significantly higher EPS growth rates over five years after the event than non-announcing 
borrowers.  
 
We document that firms that announce their loans have a significantly higher forecasted EPS 
growth rate at the time of the loan than non-announcing firms. Yet announcing firms do not 
actually grow faster than non-announcing firms over the next five years. We also compare the 
three-year abnormal returns of announcing and non-announcing firms after the loan and find no 
significant difference between the two. However, we do find evidence that, post-loan, 
announcing firms have three-year abnormal returns that are either very low or very high 
compared with non-announcing firms. When we compare the operating performance of 
announcing firms with that of non-announcing firms, we find no evidence that announcing firms 
fare better than non-announcing firms. 
 
In this chapter, we discuss some of several prospective explanations for our results. It is possible 
that banks have lost their specialness over time and, therefore, announcements of bank loans no 
longer mitigate information asymmetry. It is also possible that after studies were published 
showing the positive effect of loan announcements, more firms started announcing their bank 
loans, expecting positive announcement returns. As a result, loan announcements lost 
importance, and the associated announcement effect disappeared. Also the positive 
announcement effect observed earlier may not have reflected the certification role of the lending 
banks as quasi-insiders and accordingly did not mitigate information asymmetry. The positive 
announcement effect could simply have been the market’s response to the news of availability of 
funds to meet the firm’s growth needs. Perhaps studying the market’s response to loan 
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announcements is not an appropriate approach for capturing bank specialness! These are 
questions for future research.  
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Table 3.1: Survey of Literature on Bank Loan Announcement Effects 
 
Paper Author Time Source Method 
Initial 
sample 
Final 
sample 
Clean 
Sample   
Journal of Financial 
Economics (1986) 
Mikkelson and 
Partch    360    
Journal of Financial 
Economics (1987) James 
1974 - 
1983 Wall Street Journal Index 
Search WSJI for all debt 
announcement for random 
sample of 300 firms  117 117 * 
Journal of Financial 
Economics (1989) 
Lummer and 
McConnell 
1976 - 
1986 Wall Street Journal Index 
Search for credit 
agreements in the WSJ  1145 728 728   
Journal of Banking 
and Finance (1992) 
Slovin, Johnson, and 
Glascock 
1980 - 
1986 Dow Jones News Wire 
Search for credit 
agreements in DJ Newswire 676 273 273   
Journal of Finance 
(1993) Best and Zhang 
Jan 77- 
Dec 89 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 
Search for bank loan 
announcements in WSJ  491 491   
Journal of Financial 
Services Research 
(1994) 
Preece and 
Mullineaux 
Jan 80 
- Dec 
87 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 
Search for credit 
agreements in WSJ  439 439   
Applied Financial 
Economics (1995) Armitage 
Jan 88 
- Dec 
91 
International Financing 
Review (IFR), Euroweek, 
Screen Insider 
Keyword search for 
syndicated loans in UK 659 574 430   
Journal of Finance 
(1995) 
Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel 
1980 - 
1989 
Dow Jones News Retrieval 
Service 
Keyword search for credit 
and loans  1468 626   
Journal of Banking 
and Finance (2000) 
Aintablian and 
Roberts 
1988 - 
1995 
Canadian Newswire, 
Canadian Corporate News, 
and Financial Post 
Database 
keyword search for credit 
and loans by Canadian 
Firms  137 137   
Quarterly Review of 
Economics and 
Finance (2003) 
Gasbarro, Fery, and 
Woodliff, and 
Zumwalt 
Jan 83 
- Dec 
99 
IFR Platinum Database of 
Thomson Financial 
Publishing 
Search for Australian firms 
reaching credit agreements   196   
Journal of Financial 
Research (2004) 
Gasbarro, Song-Le, 
and Schwebach, 
and Zumwalt 
1995 - 
2000 
IFR Platinum Database 
and Dow Jones Interactive 
Index 
keyword search for 
"Launched", "Sold", 
"Issued", or "Priced"  2061  ** 
* 207 Total financing announcements including straight debt               ** This includes multiple announcements and they do not screen for contamination  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics – Population of Loans in LPC’s Dealscan Database (1987-2004) and Randomly 
Selected Sample of Loans 
 
Population 
Variable Description N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Ratings Senior debt rating; AAA = 9, AA =8 .. C=1 6,949 5.51 1.3 1 9 
lenders Number of Lenders 20,127 5.46 7.7 1 110 
Tenor Tenor 18,011 44.78 34 1 366 
d_amt amount of the loan deal (millions) 20,140 273 708 0.05 25,000 
AIS All-in-spread drawn 16,234 199.68 137 -14 1,490 
Sales Borrower's sale in the prior year (millions) 18,132 2,278 8,994 - 273,834 
Syndicated Dummy variable =1 for syndicated loans 20,127 0.59 0.49 0 1 
 
Sample 
Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Ratings Senior debt rating; AAA = 9, AA =8 .. C=1 342 5.69 1.18 3 9 
lenders Number of Lenders 800 6.15 8.83 1 108 
Tenor Tenor 715 41.46 32.72 0 361 
d_amt amount of the loan deal (millions) 800 309.6 719.85 0.2 12,000 
AIS All-in-spread drawn 676 182 129.38 6.32 980 
Sales Borrower's sale in the prior year (millions) 741 3,229 10,431 1.22 186,763 
Syndicated Dummy variable =1 for syndicated loans 800 0.63 0.48 0 1 
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Table 3.3: Event Day Abnormal Returns for Borrowing Firms Announcing their Bank Loans 
 
Panel A – Full sample period 
Event Day Returns N Mean t-stat *  t-stat ** 
      
Holding Period Return 94 -0.06% 0.18  0.12 
Market Adjusted Return 94 -0.39% 1.17  0.78 
Sigma Adjusted Return 53 -0.07% 0.83  0.14 
Beta Adjusted Return 55 0.05% 0.35  0.09 
      
 
Panel B – Pre 95 
Event Day Returns N Mean t-stat *  t-stat ** 
      
Holding Period Return 21 1.32% 1.47  1.44 
Market Adjusted Return 21 1.13% 1.05  1.17 
Sigma Adjusted Return 11 1.16% 0.68  0.96 
Beta Adjusted Return 11 1.35% 1.22  1.12 
      
 
Panel C – Post 95 
Event Day Returns N Mean t-stat *  t-stat ** 
      
Holding Period Return 73 -0.46% 0.96  0.75 
Market Adjusted Return 73 -0.82% 1.88  1.24 
Sigma Adjusted Return 42 -0.39% 1.29  0.56 
Beta Adjusted Return 44 -0.27% 0.80  0.39 
      
 
* Assuming cross sectional independence of excess returns 
** Assuming cross sectional dependence in the security-specific excess returns  
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Table 3.4: Event Day and Event Period Abnormal Returns for Borrowing Firms Announcing Syndicated and Non-
syndicated Loans 
 
Non-syndicated Loans 
 Returns Pre-95 Post 95 total 
  (N=9) (N=26) (N=35) 
1-day Holding Period Return 2.7% -1.2% -0.2% 
1-day Market Adjusted Return 2.5% -1.5% -0.5% 
3-day Holding Period Return 5.2% 0.4% 1.6% 
3-day Market Adjusted Return 4.4% -0.2% 1.0% 
    
Syndicated Loans 
  Returns Pre-95 Post 95 total 
  (N=12) (N=47) (N=59) 
1-day Holding Period Return 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
1-day Market Adjusted Return 0.1% -0.5% -0.3% 
3-day Holding Period Return 2.1% -0.7% -0.1% 
3-day Market Adjusted Return 1.6% -0.4% 0.0% 
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics – Senior Debt Rating and Operating Profit-to-Assets Ratio of Borrowing Firms of 
Randomly Selected Sample of Loans 
 
Panel A 
Rating (Senior) 
    Ann. by  
Company 
% of  
total Total Announced Percent  
AAA 1 0 0%  0 0% 
AA 12 0 0%  0 0% 
A 80 9 11%  4 5% 
BBB 106 20 19%  19 18% 
BB 80 32 40%  18 23% 
B 55 28 51%  14 25% 
CCC 8 6 75%  2 25% 
       
Unrated 458 137 30%  111 24% 
       
Total 800 232    168   
 
Panel B 
EBITDA / TA 
    Ann. by  
Company 
% of 
total Total Announced Percent  
<=0 107 44 41%  40 37% 
0<x<.10 161 47 29%  29 18% 
.10<=x.15 186 56 30%  40 22% 
.15<=x<.20 162 42 26%  30 19% 
x>=.20 119 26 22%  16 13% 
       
No Data 65 17 26%  13 20% 
       
Total 800 232    168   
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Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics – Interest-to-Operating Profit Ratio of Borrowing Firms of Randomly Selected 
Sample of Loans 
 
Panel A 
  Announced by 
Interest / EBITDA Total company Others Total 
0<=x<.10 231 40 17 57 
.10<=x<.25 222 37 21 58 
.25<=x<.50 116 22 12 34 
x>=.50 64 17 6 23 
+ve Interest but -ve or ‘0’ income 97 38 3 41 
     
No data 70 14 5 19 
Total 800 168 64 232 
 
 
Panel B 
Interest / EBITDA 
Announced/ 
Total 
Company/ 
Total 
Company/ 
Announced 
0<=x<.10 25% 17% 70% 
.10<=x<.25 26% 17% 64% 
.25<=x<.50 29% 19% 65% 
x>=.50 36% 27% 74% 
+ve Interest but -ve or '0' income 42% 39% 93% 
    
No data 27% 20% 74% 
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Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics – Market Capitalization of Borrowing Firms of Randomly Selected Sample of 
Loans 
 
Panel A 
  Announced by 
Market Cap Total Company Others Total 
     
<=100M 168 51 8 59 
100M<x<=300M 127 41 11 52 
300M<x<=1B 149 39 16 55 
1B<x<=10B 185 20 18 38 
x>10B 67 1 4 5 
     
No price 104 16 7 23 
Total 800 168 64 232 
 
 
Panel B 
As a percent 
Announced/ 
Total 
Company/ 
Total 
Company/ 
Announced 
    
<=100M 35% 30% 86% 
100M<x<=300M 41% 32% 79% 
300M<x<=1B 37% 26% 71% 
1B<x<=10B 21% 10% 53% 
x>10B 7% 1% 20% 
    
No price 22% 15% 70% 
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Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics – Loan size-to-Total Assets Ratio for Randomly Selected Sample of Loans 
 
Panel A 
Loan-to-assets Ratio 
 Announced 
Total Company Others Total 
X<=0.05 111 5 4 9 
0.05<x<=0.1 100 11 8 19 
0.1<x<=0.25 232 44 18 62 
0.25<x<=0.5 158 48 13 61 
x>0.5 134 47 17 64 
     
No data 65 13 4 17 
Total 800 168 64 232 
 
 
Panel B 
Loan-to-assets Ratio 
Announced/ 
Total 
Company/ 
Total 
Company/ 
Announced 
x<=0.05 8% 5% 56% 
0.05<x<=0.1 19% 11% 58% 
0.1<x<=0.25 27% 19% 71% 
0.25<x<=0.5 39% 30% 79% 
x>0.5 48% 35% 73% 
    
No data 26% 20% 76% 
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Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics – Number of Analysts Following the borrowing company 
 
 Announcement by company   
Full Sample unannounced announced Total % ann 
     
1 to 4 158 68 226 30% 
5 to 8 104 39 143 27% 
9 to 15 117 16 133 12% 
16 to 41 127 7 134 5% 
     
No data (implies 0) 117 37 154 24% 
Total 623 167 790 21%  
     
Post 95     
     
1 to 4 114 56 170 33% 
5 to 8 89 36 125 29% 
9 to 15 98 15 113 13% 
16 to 41 104 5 109 5% 
     
No data (implies 0) 66 28 94 30% 
Total 471 140 611 23% 
     
Pre 95     
     
1 to 4 44 12 56 21% 
5 to 8 15 3 18 17% 
9 to 15 19 1 20 5% 
16 to 41 23 2 25 8% 
     
No data (implies 0) 51 9 60 15% 
Total 152 27 179 15% 
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Table 3.10: Analysts’ Forecast of Long-term growth (LTG) of the Borrowing Firms of Randomly Selected Sample 
of Loans 
 
Panel A 
 
Mean of the Forecasted Long Term Growth Estimates  
for the Company 
  
Panel B 
 
Median of the Forecasted Long Term Growth Estimates 
 for the Company 
 
 Announcement by Company t-stat   Announcement by Company t-stat 
Full Sample unannounced announced  Diff. of means  Full Sample unannounced announced  Diff. of means 
Mean         15.88       19.72              3.80*   Mean         15.73       19.20              3.68*  
 n            460           98    N           460           98   
Std. Dev.          8.15        9.28     Std. Dev.          8.14        8.55    
         
Pre 95     Pre 95    
Mean         17.12       15.58             -0.76  Mean         17.00       15.50             -0.75 
 n              87           10    n             87           10   
Std. Dev.          8.14        5.79     Std. Dev.          8.23        5.68    
         
Post 95     Post 95    
Mean         15.58       20.19              4.20*   Mean          15.43       19.62              4.10*  
 n            373           88    n           373           88   
Std. Dev.          8.14        9.50     Std. Dev.          8.10        8.74    
         
     
 Medians     
     full sample         14.50       17.25              4.25*  
     pre 95         15.00       13.50             -0.35 
     post 95         14.00       17.75              4.77*  
 
* Significant at 5% level 
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Table 3.11: Descriptive Statistics – Coefficient of Variation (CV) of EPS estimates for Borrowing Firms  
 
 
CV Announcement by company   
 unannounced announced Total Proportion 
<.05 255 55 310 17.7% 
.05<=x<.1 83 16 99 16.2% 
<.1<=x<.25 70 14 84 16.7% 
.25<=x<.5 29 8 37 21.6% 
>=.5 18 9 27 33.3% 
     
Grand Total 455 102 557 18.3% 
     
Difference of proportions Test 
     
<.25 408 85 493 17.2% 
>=.25 47 17 64 26.6% 
     
t-stat     1.81* 
 
* Significant at 5% level 
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Table 3.12: Analyst Following and Dispersion of Opinion 
 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Number of Analysts 
 Panel B 
 
Coefficient of Variation (CV) of EPS Estimates 
 Announcement by Company t-stat    Announcement by Company t-stat  
Full Sample unannounced announced diff of means  Full Sample Unannounced announced diff of means 
Mean of # of analysts 8.64 4.32 8.34  Mean of CV 0.16 0.26 0.98 
n 623 167   n 455 102  
Std. Dev 8.78 4.91   Std Dev 0.59 0.96  
         
Pre 95     Pre 95    
Mean of # of analysts 6.18 3.59 2.08  Mean of CV 0.24 0.14 -1.17 
n 152 27   n 87 13  
Std. Dev 8.19 5.46   Std Dev 0.64 0.20  
         
Post 95     Post 95    
Mean of # of analysts 9.44 4.46 8.65  Mean of CV 0.14 0.28 1.18 
n 471 140   n 368 89  
Std. Dev 8.82 4.81   Std Dev 0.58 1.03  
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Table 3.13: Actual Annualized 5-Year EPS Growth Rate of the Borrowing Firm at the Time of Loan 
 
 
  Announcement by company    t-stat  
Full Sample unannounced announced  Diff. of means  
Mean           10.78         12.58              0.54  
N              415            104   
Std. Dev.           25.79         31.64    
    
Pre 95    
Mean           15.93         19.55              0.31  
N                66             11   
Std. Dev.           30.35         36.17    
    
Post 95    
Mean             9.80         11.76              0.56  
N              349             93   
Std. Dev.           24.76         31.18    
    
    
Medians     
Full sample             9.00           9.28              0.24  
Pre 95           10.49           9.20             -0.27 
Post 95             8.71           9.36              0.11  
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 Table 3.14: Descriptive Statistics – Characteristics of Borrowing Firms of Randomly Selected Sample of Loans 
 
 
Variable Description N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
announce 1 if loan was announced; otherwise 0 800 0.29 0.45 - 1.00 
synd 1 if loan was syndicated; otherwise 0 800 0.63 0.48 - 1.00 
company 1 if the company announced loan; otherwise 0 800 0.21 0.41 - 1.00 
loan_Asset Ratio of Loan size to Total Assets 735 0.33 0.46 0.00 7.11 
cap Market capitalization of the borrowing firm 696 4,704,468,145 15,296,830,057 1,179,900 162,418,904,250 
pre95 1 if loan made in 1995 or before; otherwise 0 800 0.23 0.42 - 1.00 
analysts # of analysts following borrowing company 790 7.73 8.30 - 41.00 
ltg Mean analyst forecast of long term growth 558 16.55 8.48 - 75.00 
abscv abs(std. dev of EPS estimates / mean estimate) 557 0.18 0.68 - 9.00 
ebitda_ta Ratio of EBITDA to Total Assets 735 0.11 0.13 -0.97 0.58 
L_la Log (1+ loan size / Total Assets) 735 0.25 0.24 0.00 2.09 
L_abscv Log (1+ abs(std. dev / mean)) 557 0.11 0.25 - 2.30 
distress 1 if EBITDA <=0; otherwise 0 735 0.15 0.35 - 1.00 
invest 1 if firm rated A or higher; otherwise 0 342 0.27 0.45 - 1.00 
L_ltg log (1+ mean analyst forecast of LTG) 558 2.76 0.45 - 4.33 
big 1 if market cap > $1 billion; otherwise 0 696 0.36 0.48 - 1.00 
follow 1 if followed by more than 8 analysts; otherwise 0 790 0.34 0.47 - 1.00 
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Table 3.15: Logistic Regression to Predict Probability of a Loan Being Announced in the Media 
 
Variable Description Estimate Std. Err. Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept  -3.48720 0.86670 16.18840 <.0001 
synd 1 if the loan had two or more lenders; otherwise 0 0.7124 0.2908 6.0029 0.0143 
l_ltg log ( 1+ mean analyst estimate of long term growth) 0.5167 0.2827 3.3410 0.0676 
distress 1 if EBITDA <= 0; otherwise 0 0.0210 0.5210 0.0016 0.9679 
l_absCV log ( 1 + abs(std. dev. Of EPS est. / mean EPS)) 1.0836 0.4562 5.6415 0.0175 
follow 1 if followed by more than 8 analysts; otherwise 0 -0.6670 0.2869 5.4062 0.0201 
big 1 if market cap > $ 1 billion; otherwise 0 -0.0401 0.3068 0.0171 0.8959 
l_la log ( 1 + loans size / total assets) 2.8225 0.6138 21.1427 <.0001 
pre95 1 if loan made in 1995 or before; otherwise 0; -0.0866 0.3152 0.0754 0.7836 
N = 495                                                           Likelihood Ratio = 81.2195                                          Wald Stats. = 64.5379 
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Table 3.16: Marginal Probability of Announcement in the Media 
 
 
 Base Value Change to New Probability Change in Prob 
     
Syndicated Loan dummy 0 1 36.97% 14.63% 
Long-term EPS growth estimate (%) 10 20 28.67% 6.32% 
Negative or Zero EBITDA dummy 0 1 22.71% 0.37% 
Coefficient of Variation of EPS Estimates 0.20 0.40 25.38% 3.03% 
Followed by More than 8 Analysts dummy 0 1 12.87% -9.48% 
Market Cap of Over $1 billion dummy 0 1 21.66% -0.69% 
Loan-to-Assets Ratio 0.33 0.66 34.97% 12.63% 
Pre 95 dummy 0 1 20.88% -1.47% 
     
Probability of announcement at base value 22.34%    
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Table 3.17: Logistic Regression to Predict Probability of a Loan Being Announced in the Media 
 
Variable Description Estimate Std. Err. Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept  -3.81340 0.96420 15.64270 <.0001 
synd 1 if the loan had two or more lenders; otherwise 0 0.7170 0.2928 5.9958 0.0143 
l_ltg log ( 1+ mean analyst estimate of long term growth) 0.6646 0.3207 4.2951 0.0382 
distress 1 if EBITDA <= 0; otherwise 0 -0.0893 0.5316 0.0282 0.8667 
l_absCV log ( 1 + abs(std. dev. Of EPS est. / mean EPS)) 1.1731 0.4876 5.7889 0.0161 
follow 1 if followed by more than 8 analysts; otherwise 0 -0.8976 0.3094 8.4192 0.0037 
big 1 if market cap > $ 1 billion; otherwise 0 -0.0269 0.3053 0.0078 0.9297 
l_la log ( 1 + loans size / total assets) 2.7774 0.6677 17.3033 <.0001 
pre95 1 if loan made in 1995 or before; otherwise 0; 1.1455 1.9433 0.3475 0.5556 
p_l_ltg interaction of Pre95 and l_ltg -0.5609 0.6782 0.6841 0.4082 
p_l_la interaction of Pre95 and l_la -0.3819 1.6708 0.0522 0.8192 
p_follow interaction of Pre95 and follow 1.1916 0.6334 3.5385 0.0600 
p_l_abscv interaction of Pre95 and l_absCV -1.0633 1.5618 0.4635 0.4960 
N = 495                                                          Likelihood Ratio =  87.1828                              Wald Stats. = 68.9307 
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Table 3.18: Marginal Probability of Announcement in the Media – Pre- and Post-95 
 
 
 Post 95  Pre 95 
 
Base 
Value 
Change 
to 
New 
Probability 
Change in 
Probability  
Base 
Value 
Change 
to 
New 
Probability 
Change in 
Probability 
Syndicated Loan dummy 0 1 37.83% 14.93%  0 1 26.91% 11.67% 
Long-term EPS growth estimate (%) 10 20 31.34% 8.44%  10 20 16.12% 0.88% 
Negative or Zero EBITDA dummy 0 1 21.36% -1.54%  0 1 14.12% -1.12% 
Coefficient of Variation of EPS Estimates 0.20 0.40 26.25% 3.35%  0.20 0.40 15.46% 0.22% 
Followed by More than 8 Analysts dummy 0 1 10.80% -12.10%  0 1 19.43% 4.19% 
Market Cap of Over $1 billion dummy 0 1 22.43% -0.47%  0 1 14.89% -0.35% 
Loan-to-Assets Ratio 0.33 0.66 35.47% 12.57%  0.33 0.66 23.41% 8.17% 
Pre 95 dummy 0 1 15.24% -7.66%  0 1   
          
Probability of announcement at base value 22.90%      15.24%     
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Table 3.19: Logistic Regression to Predict Probability of a Company Announcing its Bank Loan 
 
 
Variable Description Estimate Std. Err. Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept  -3.77150 0.95520 15.58830 <.0001 
l_ltg log ( 1+ mean analyst estimate of long term growth) 0.7231 0.3259 4.9238 0.0265 
distress 1 if EBITDA <= 0; otherwise 0 0.1974 0.5477 0.1299 0.7186 
l_absCV log ( 1 + abs(std. dev. Of EPS est. / mean EPS)) 0.4887 0.4408 1.2292 0.2676 
follow 1 if followed by more than 8 analysts; otherwise 0 -0.6083 0.3414 3.1752 0.0748 
big 1 if market cap > $ 1 billion; otherwise 0 -0.4377 0.3646 1.4412 0.2299 
l_la log ( 1 + loans size / total assets) 2.3690 0.6209 14.5567 0.0001 
pre95 1 if loan made in 1995 or before; otherwise 0 -0.8798 0.4202 4.3835 0.0363 
N = 495                                                            Likelihood Ratio = 69.3937                                            Wald Stats. = 56.85 
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Table 3.20: Marginal Probability of Announcement of a Bank Loan by the Borrowing Company 
 
 
Variable Base Value Change to New Probability Change in Probability 
     
Long-term EPS growth estimate (%) 10 20 30.89% 9.01% 
Negative or Zero EBITDA dummy 0 1 25.44% 3.56% 
Coefficient of Variation of EPS Estimates 0.20 0.40 23.19% 1.31% 
Followed by More than 8 Analysts dummy 0 1 13.23% -8.65% 
Market Cap of Over $1 billion dummy 0 1 15.31% -6.57% 
Loan-to-Assets Ratio 0.33 0.66 32.13% 10.25% 
Pre 95 dummy 0 1 10.41% -11.47% 
     
Probability of ann. by company at base value 21.88%    
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Table 3.21: Logistic Regression to Predict Probability of a Company Announcing its Loan 
 
 
Variable Description Estimate Std. Err. Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept  -4.71540 1.06330 19.66500 <.0001 
l_ltg log ( 1+ mean analyst estimate of long term growth) 1.0370 0.3615 8.2282 0.0041 
distress 1 if EBITDA <= 0; otherwise 0 0.0487 0.5546 0.0077 0.9300 
l_absCV log ( 1 + abs(std. dev. Of EPS est. / mean EPS)) 0.5919 0.4397 1.8118 0.1783 
follow 1 if followed by more than 8 analysts; otherwise 0 -0.7073 0.3624 3.8089 0.0510 
big 1 if market cap > $ 1 billion; otherwise 0 -0.3585 0.3668 0.9551 0.3284 
l_la log ( 1 + loans size / total assets) 2.5130 0.6725 13.9654 0.0002 
pre95 1 if loan made in 1995 or before; otherwise 0; 3.7721 1.9955 3.5731 0.0587 
p_l_ltg interaction of Pre95 and l_ltg -1.5307 0.7316 4.3772 0.0364 
p_l_la interaction of Pre95 and l_la -1.5614 2.0687 0.5697 0.4504 
p_follow interaction of Pre95 and follow 0.3664 0.8626 0.1805 0.6710 
N=495                                                            Likelihood Ratio = 75.4761                                              Wald Stats.= 61.60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107
Table 3.22: Marginal Probability of Announcement by Company – Pre- and Post-95 
 
 
 Post 95  Pre 95 
Variable Base Value Change to 
New 
Probability 
Change in 
Probability  
Base 
Value 
Change 
to 
New 
Probability 
Change in 
Probability 
          
Long-term EPS growth estimate (%) 10 20 32.44% 12.72%  10% 20% 11.23% -3.60% 
Negative or Zero EBITDA dummy 0 1 20.50% 0.78%  0 1 15.46% 0.63% 
Coefficient of Variation of EPS Estimates 0.20 0.40 21.20% 1.48%  0.2 0.4 16.02% 1.19% 
Followed by More than 8 Analysts dummy 0 1 10.80% -8.92%  0 1 11.02% -3.81% 
Market Cap of Over $1 billion dummy 0 1 14.65% -5.07%  0 1 10.85% -3.98% 
Loan-to-Assets Ratio 0.33 0.66 30.00% 10.29%  0.33 0.66 17.70% 2.87% 
Pre 95 dummy 0 1 14.83% -4.88%  1    
          
Probability of ann. by company at base value 19.71%     14.83%    
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Table 3.23: Abnormal Returns and Interest Expense-to-Operating Profit Ratio of Borrowing Firms Announcing 
their Bank Loans 
 
Pre 95 
Returns 
Interest Expense-to-EBITDA ratio 
positive but less than 
equal to 0.5 
negative or 
greater than 0.5 
N Mean N Mean 
     
3-day Holding Period 15 2.39% 5 6.13% 
3-day Market Adjusted 15 1.86% 5 5.22% 
1-day Holding Period 15 0.47% 5 4.04% 
1-day Market Adjusted 15 0.35% 5 3.68% 
     
     
     
Post 95 
Returns 
Interest Expense-to- EBITDA ratio 
positive but less than 
equal to 0.5 
negative or 
greater than 0.5 
N Mean N Mean 
     
3-day Holding Period 45 -0.97% 25 0.81% 
3-day Market Adjusted 45 -1.02% 25 1.05% 
1-day Holding Period 45 -0.09% 25 -0.89% 
1-day Market Adjusted 45 -0.55% 25 -1.07% 
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Table 3.24: Descriptive Statistics – 3-Year Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns of Bank Loan Borrowers 
 
3 Year BHAR over value 
weighted market 
Announcement by company  Ann as % 
of total 
 3 Year BHAR over equal 
weighted market 
Announcement by company  Ann as % 
of total unannounced announced Total  unannounced Announced Total 
<-1 55 19 74 26%  <-1.5 82 20 102 20% 
-1<=x<-0.3 116 17 133 13%  -1.5<=x<-1 94 13 107 12% 
-0.3<=x<0.3 98 16 114 14%  -1<=x<0 165 33 198 17% 
0.3<=x<1 91 16 107 15%  0<=x<1 55 14 69 20% 
>=1 56 22 78 28%  >=1 20 10 30 33% 
Total 416 90 506 18%  Total 416 90 506 18% 
           
Post 95      Post 95     
<-1 41 14 55 25%  <-1.5 48 13 61 21% 
-1<=x<-0.3 75 14 89 16%  -1.5<=x<-1 72 12 84 14% 
-0.3<=x<0.3 79 13 92 14%  -1<=x<0 137 30 167 18% 
0.3<=x<1 80 16 96 17%  0<=x<1 47 13 60 22% 
>=1 45 18 63 29%  >=1 16 7 23 30% 
Total 320 75 395 19%  Total 320 75 395 19% 
           
Pre 95      Pre 95     
<-1 14 5 19 26%  <-1.5 34 7 41 17% 
-1<=x<-0.3 41 3 44 7%  -1.5<=x<-1 22 1 23 4% 
-0.3<=x<0.3 19 3 22 14%  -1<=x<0 28 3 31 10% 
0.3<=x<1 11 0 11 0%  0<=x<1 8 1 9 11% 
>=1 11 4 15 27%  >=1 4 3 7 43% 
Total 96 15 111 14%  Total 96 15 111 14% 
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Table 3.25: 3-Year Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) of Borrowing Firms – Difference of Means Test and 
Median Test 
 
Mean n 
BHAR over value weighted 
market return 
Absolute value of value 
weighted BHAR 
unannounced 416 0.11 0.87 
Announced by company 90 0.77 1.64 
t-stat (Difference of Means)   2.17* 
    
Median    
unannounced 470 -0.09 0.66 
Announced by company 103 -0.04 0.90 
t-stat (Median Test)  0.46 2.09* 
    
    
    
Pre95    
unannounced 96 0.10 1.09 
Announced by company 15 1.79 2.98 
t-stat (Difference of Means)   1.37 
    
    
    
Post 95    
unannounced 320 0.11 0.80 
Announced by company 75 0.57 1.37 
t-stat (Difference of Means)   1.78* 
 
* Significant at 5% level 
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Table 3.26: Descriptive Statistics – 3-Year Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Bank Loan Borrowers 
 
3-Year CAR over value 
weighted market 
Announcement by company 
Total 
Ann as 
% of total 
 3-Year CAR over equal 
weighted market 
Announcement by company 
Total 
Ann as % 
of total unannounced Announced  unannounced announced 
<-0.5 105 26 131 20%  <-0.75 73 18 91 20% 
-0.5<=x<-0.2 82 10 92 11%  -0.75<=x<-0.4 142 20 162 12% 
-0.2<=x<0.2 81 16 97 16%  -0.4<=x<0 125 30 155 19% 
0.2<=x<1 93 19 112 17%  0<=x<0.5 55 12 67 18% 
>=1 55 19 74 26%  >=0.5 21 10 31 32% 
Total 416 90 506 18%  Total 416 90 506 18% 
           
Post 95      Post 95     
<-0.5 74 19 93 20%  <-0.75 52 14 66 21% 
-0.5<=x<-0.2 60 9 69 13%  -0.75<=x<-0.4 106 16 122 13% 
-0.2<=x<0.2 59 13 72 18%  -0.4<=x<0 98 27 125 22% 
0.2<=x<1 79 19 98 19%  0<=x<0.5 47 11 58 19% 
>=1 48 15 63 24%  >=0.5 17 7 24 29% 
Total 320 75 395 19%  Total 320 75 395 19% 
           
Pre 95      Pre 95     
<-0.5 31 7 38 18%  <-0.75 21 4 25 16% 
-0.5<=x<-0.2 22 1 23 4%  -0.75<=x<-0.4 36 4 40 10% 
-0.2<=x<0.2 22 3 25 12%  -0.4<=x<0 27 3 30 10% 
0.2<=x<1 14  14 0%  0<=x<0.5 8 1 9 11% 
>=1 7 4 11 36%  >=0.5 4 3 7 43% 
Total 96 15 111 14%  Total 96 15 111 14% 
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Table 3.27: Descriptive Statistics – 3-Year Cumulative Abnormal Returns over Standard Deviation Matched and 
Beta Matched Portfolios 
 
3-Year CAR over SD 
matched portfolio 
Announcement by company 
Total 
Ann as % 
of total 
 3-Year CAR over beta 
matched portfolio 
Announcement by company 
Total 
Ann as % 
of total unannounced announced  unannounced announced 
<-0.5 78 16 94 17%  <-0.5 81 14 95 15% 
-0.5<=x<-0.2 74 7 81 9%  -0.5<=x<-0.2 79 8 87 9% 
-0.2<=x<0.2 100 15 115 13%  -0.2<=x<0.2 111 15 126 12% 
0.2<=x<1 44 5 49 10%  0.2<=x<1 40 11 51 22% 
>=1 46 14 60 23%  >=1 28 9 37 24% 
Total 342 57 399 14%  Total 339 57 396 14% 
           
Post 95      Post 95     
<-0.5 62 14 76 18%  <-0.5 65 12 77 16% 
-0.5<=x<-0.2 65 7 72 10%  -0.5<=x<-0.2 67 8 75 11% 
-0.2<=x<0.2 80 13 93 14%  -0.2<=x<0.2 90 13 103 13% 
0.2<=x<1 34 5 39 13%  0.2<=x<1 33 11 44 25% 
>=1 40 13 53 25%  >=1 25 8 33 24% 
Total 281 52 333 16%  Total 280 52 332 16% 
           
Pre 95      Pre 95     
<-0.5 16 2 18 11%  <-0.5 16 2 18 11% 
-0.5<=x<-0.2 9  9 0%  -0.5<=x<-0.2 12  12 0% 
-0.2<=x<0.2 20 2 22 9%  -0.2<=x<0.2 21 2 23 9% 
0.2<=x<1 10  10 0%  0.2<=x<1 7  7 0% 
>=1 6 1 7 14%  >=1 3 1 4 25% 
Total 61 5 66 8%  Total 59 5 64 8% 
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Table 3.28: 3-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of Bank Loan Borrowers – Difference of Means Test and 
Median Test 
 
 
Mean 
CAR over value 
weighted market 
return 
Absolute value of 
value weighted 
CAR 
CAR over standard 
deviation matched 
portfolio 
CAR over beta 
matched portfolio 
     
Unannounced 0.19 0.72 -0.07 -0.13 
Announced by company 0.82 1.39 0.15 0.12 
     
t-stat (Difference of means)  1.98* 1.21 1.29 
     
     
     
Median     
     
Unannounced -0.09 0.51 -0.12 -0.18 
Announced by company -0.07 0.67 0.02 -.06 
     
t-stat (Median test) 0.46 2.32* 1.02 1.57 
 
 
* Significant at 5% level 
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 Table 3.29: Median Annual Growth Rate of Operating Efficiency Measures for Borrowing Firms Each Year after 
the Loan Closing  
 
 
Years after loan   Announcement by Company  n  EBITDA/TA NI/SALES NI/ASSETS EBITDA/#EMP ASSETS/#EMP 
0 Unannounced  577 -4% -15% -18% 3% 6% 
 Announced  152 -9% -25% -33% 0% 4% 
        
 1  Unannounced  560 -3% -10% -12% 2%* 4% 
 Announced  144 0% -12% -19% 6% 6% 
        
 2  Unannounced  539 0% -4% -3% 5% 5% 
 Announced  128 0% -8% -9% 1% 3% 
        
 3  Unannounced  488 -1% -5% -6% 2% 4% 
 Announced  107 0% -11% -17% 2% 3% 
        
 4  Unannounced  420 0% -7% -9% 4% 4% 
 Announced    83 0% -13% -10% 4% 5% 
        
 5  Unannounced  356 1% -2% -4% 5% 4% 
  Announced    70 1% 0% -5% -2% 2% 
 
*Significant at 5% level 
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Table 3.30: Median of the Annual Growth Rate in Operating Performance of Borrowing Firms over the Period 
 
 
Years after 
loan 
Announcement by 
company  EBITDA/TA NI/SALES NI/ASSETS EBITDA/#EMP ASSETS/#EMP 
        
1-3 Unannounced  1% -1% 0% 6% 6% 
 Announced  3% 0% 1% 7% 5% 
        
 t-stat  0.40 0.28 0.20 0.20 -0.46 
        
0-3 Unannounced  -1% -2% -3% 6% 7% 
 Announced  -2% -7% -9% 4% 6% 
        
 t-stat  -0.86 -1.10 -0.70 -0.67 -0.53 
        
1-5 Unannounced  1% -1% 0% 7% 6% 
 Announced  2% -1% 1% 8% 5% 
        
 t-stat  0.20 -0.09 0.20 0.42 -0.47 
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 Table 3.31: Actual Annualized 5-Year EPS Growth Rate of the Borrowing Firms after Loan Closing 
 
 
   Announcement by Company   t-stat  
Full Sample unannounced announced  Diff. of means  
Mean           10.95            13.28  0.57 
N              351                 70   
Std. Dev.           27.11            32.07   
    
Pre 95    
Mean             8.68            26.60  1.29 
N                95                 15   
Std. Dev.           25.52            52.76   
    
Post 95    
Mean           11.80              9.64  -0.61 
N              256                 55   
Std. Dev.           27.67            23.02   
    
       
Median unannounced announced t-stat 
Full sample           10.25            10.51  1.32 
Pre 95             5.36            11.95    1.93* 
Post 95           10.10            10.41  0.17 
 
* Significant at 5% level 
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Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.2 
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Appendix A1: Calculation of t-statistics Assuming Cross-sectional Independence 
 
Assuming cross-sectional independence of excess returns, we calculate our test statistics as 
follows: Each excess return Ai,t is first divided by its estimated standard deviation to yield a 
standardized excess return, tiA ,' : 
),(/' ,
^
,, tititi ASAA =  
Where 
251)()(ˆ
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The test statistics for t=0 is given by  
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Nt is the number of sample securities at day t where t represents trading day.  
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Appendix A2: Calculation of t-statistics Assuming Cross-sectional Dependence 
 
By using the time-series of average excess returns (i.e., “portfolio” excess return), the test 
statistics calculated as follows takes into account cross sectional dependence in the security-
specific excess returns (Brown & Warner, 1985). The test-statistics is equal to 
)(ˆ/ tASA  , 
where, 
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Nt is the number of sample securities in the portfolio at day t where t represents calendar day.  
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